Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective by Wiedenbeck, Peter J.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 50 
Issue 1 Winter 1985 Article 8 
Winter 1985 
Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective 
Peter J. Wiedenbeck 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 MO. L. REV. (1985) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 





I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 85
II. D ISCUSSION ............................................ 87
A. History and Policy .................................. 87
B. Eligible Donees and Purposes ........................ 102
C. Percentage Limitations and Carryover ................. 110
D. Amount Deductible ................................. 117
E. Contributions of Partial Interests ..................... 126
F. Direct Charitable Deduction for Non-Itemizers ......... 130
III. FUTURE ISSUES ......................................... 132
A. M inimum Tax ..................................... 132
B. Percentage Limits ................................... 137
IV. CONCLUSION ........................................... 138
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to lay out the structure of the income tax
charitable contribution deduction and provide an overview of the policies that
have influenced that structure. As originally enacted, the statutory authoriza-
tion of a deduction for gifts to charity" was two sentences in length.2 Today,
* Copyright 1984 Peter J. Wiedenbeck.
** Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.Sc.
1976, University of Toronto; J.D. 1979, University of Michigan. The author gratefully
acknowledges that the ideas for several of the problems discussed herein were sug-
gested by the late Professor L. Hart Wright of the University of Michigan Law School.
1. As used herein the terms "charity" and "charitable organization" refer to
all organizations exempt from tax under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982) and eligible to re-
ceive deductible contributions under section 170(c)(2). These organizations must be
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or edu-
cational purposes, or to foster national or international sports competition, or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals. The term "charitable purposes" encom-
passes all the other specified exempt purposes (religious, scientific, educational, etc.)
and in general includes any purpose beneficial to the community. This expansive inter-
pretation of permissible charitable goals is derived from the common law of charitable
trusts and is an established feature of the law of tax-exempt organizations. Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2026-29 (1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
l(d)(2) (1959); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 368-77 (1959); Persons,
Osborn & Feldman, Criteria for Exemption Under Section 501 (c)(3), in IV RESEARCH
PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC
NEEDS 1909 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FILER COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS].
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section 170 takes up seven double-column pages in the statute books,3 and this
is only the tip of the iceberg. The statutory exposition of the rules governing
eligible donee organizations requires a separate subchapter of the Internal
Revenue Code, 4 to say nothing of the special excise taxes on private founda-
tions. 5 Even by Internal Revenue Code standards,' this is a phenomenal in-
crease in complexity. All this detail obscures the unifying principles which
underlie the tax treatment of charity. These principles are important because
they influence the interpretation of the statute and because they determine the
line of demarcation between the role of government and the role of private
philanthropy in our society.
This article develops a coherent understanding of the federal income tax
treatment of charitable giving by integrating the discussion of underlying prin-
ciples with a technical analysis of the statutory provisions that implement
those policies. After a general introduction to the major tax and social policy
issues implicated in the status of philanthropy under an income tax, the dis-
cussion will focus on a series of hypothetical problems designed to illustrate
the workings of the statute. This problem-and-discussion format permits a sys-
tematic review of the articulation and refinement of policy in concrete statu-
tory language. The article concludes with observations on possible future de-
velopments in the tax treatment of charitable giving.
2. See infra note 11.
3. United States Code, 1982 edition. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory
citations in the text of this article refer to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, as amended, in effect on January 1, 1985.
4. Subchapter F, governing exempt organizations, comprises sections 501 to
504, 507 to 509, and 511 to 514 of the Code, all of which relate to the tax treatment of
organizations eligible to receive deductible contributions.
5. I.R.C. §§ 4940-48, 4961-62 (1982 & West Supp. 1985). A private founda-
tion is any charitable organization exempt from tax under section 501(c)(3) that is
described in section 509. The term "public charity" is commonly used to refer to any
charitable organization that is not a private foundation. In general, the distinguishing
characteristic of a private foundation is its narrow base of support-private foundations
are generally established by large endowments contributed by a single wealthy individ-
ual or family or by a corporation.
6. The Internal Revenue Code is the longest and most complicated statute yet
devised by man. As many commentators have observed, much of this complexity is
unavoidable because in a complex economy the goal of simplicity is often antithetical to
the goals of equity and economic neutrality. E.g., Goode, Lessons from Seven Decades
of Income Taxation in OPTIONS FOR TAx REFORM 13, 14 (J. Pechman ed. 1984). Still,
certain institutional, political, and attitudinal factors unnecessarily contribute to this
complexity. The author has sometimes observed to his classes that the Internal Reve-
nue Code ought to contain a dedication page, reading:
This document is a monument to: Taxpayer inventiveness, Judicial in-
transigence, and Congressional intemperance.
[Vol. 50
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A. History and Policy
The charitable contribution deduction and the tax-exempt status of chari-
table organizations have a long history in the federal income tax. Corporations
"organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious or educational pur-
poses" were exempt from the corporate income tax of 18947 This was the
statute held unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.8 Cor-
porations "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable or edu-
cational purposes and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual" were also exempt under the corpo-
rate income tax provisions of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909.9 Similar
provisions have been a part of the tax laws ever since.10
Individuals were first permitted a deduction for contributions to qualified
charities in 1917.11 The deduction was extended to corporations in 1935.12
Most of the refinements and complexities of current law were added as anti-
abuse measures by the Tax Reform Act of 1969.11
1. Tax and Social Policy Goals
The charitable contribution deduction reduces an individual's tax base by
the amount of income that, due to a gift to charity, is no longer available for
personal consumption or saving. 4 As such, the deduction is sometimes justified
7. Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556.
8. 157 U.S. 429, afl'd on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
9. Ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112 (1909).
10. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
11. Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330, permitted a
deduction for:
Contributions or gifts actually made within the year to corporations or as-
sociations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scien-
tific or educational purposes, or to societies for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit
of any private stockholder or individual, to an amount not in excess of fifteen
per centum of the taxpayer's taxable net income as computed without the
benefit of this paragraph. Such contributions or gifts shall be allowable as
deductions only if verified under rules and regulations prescribed by the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury.
12. Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102(c), 49 Stat. 1014, 1016.
13. Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 101, 121, 201, 83 Stat. 487, 492-595. In particular,
the 1969 act attempted to prevent abuses connected with charitable contributions of
appreciated property and partial interests in property.
14. Professor Simons' oft-quoted definition states:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market
value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of
the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in
question. In other words, it is merely the result obtained by adding consump-
tion during the period to "wealth" at the end of the period and then sub-
tracting "wealth" at the beginning.
1985]
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as necessary to provide a proper measure of disposable income."' The problem
with this rationale, however, is that gifts are generally included in the donor's
tax base (i.e., no deduction is allowed) under current tax law, even though all
donative transfers may be thought to reduce the donor's disposable income.16
The proper questions, then, are: What makes gifts to charity special? Does a
gift to charity bear less resemblance to other consumption expenditures than
the typical intrafamily gift?
Two lines of reasoning support the nondeductibility of intrafamily gifts.
First, deductibility would represent too great a risk of tax-motivated transfers
to lower-bracket family members who would use the gift to finance household
consumption."7 The father who gives his teen-age son funds to purchase the
family car is an example of such disguised consumption by the donor. Second,
bona fide gifts to family members may be considered intangible consumption
by the donor, who derives satisfactions from the happiness of other family
members (vicarious pleasures) or from the status, power or influence derived
from such transfers (ego gratification). 8 Where the donor does not control the
charitable recipient, there is no substantial risk of disguised consumption. De-
duction may be justified here because the transfer is certain to lower the do-
nor's consumption or savings. If, however, intangible consumption is an impor-
tant reason for the nondeductibility of intrafamily gifts, an income-
measurement rationale will not support the charitable contribution deduction.
In this case, the psychological satisfactions of giving are deemed consumption
H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). This definition equates the source
of funds ("income" as the term is ordinarily understood, to mean a flow of receipts)
with the application of such funds.
15. E.g., COMM'N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUBLIC NEEDS, GIVING IN
AMERICA 106, 128, 134 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FILER COMMISSION REPORT].
16. Vague, general concepts of "income" or "consumption" do not dictate a
unique, theoretically correct tax treatment of gifts or bequests. Three possibili-
ties-taxing the donor (no deduction), taxing the donee (deduction for gifts given, in-
clusion of gifts received), or taxing both-are entirely consistent with either an income
or a consumption tax base. D. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF,
BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 29-31, 33-35 (2d ed. 1984). Taxing both donor
and donee, however, creates practical difficulties in taxpayer compliance and enforce-
ment. Id. at 45.
17. Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 370, 390-91
(1979).
18. H. SIMONS, supra note 14, at 57-58, 139-40. It is also sometimes asserted
that the income tax is a tax on the control of resources or exercise of economic power,
and therefore no distinction should be drawn between donative transfers and other ex-
penditures. This assertion focuses on the source rather than the application-of-funds
side of the income equation, see supra note 14, but is at base equivalent to the intangi-
ble consumption rationale. The taxpayer who exercises economic power by making a
gift is presumably motivated by the greater satisfaction to be derived by this use of
funds over alternative expenditures. See Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why
They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far From
Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 851 (1979).
[Vol. 50
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by the donor, and, even if labelled "altruism,"19 it is hard to see a difference
between the gratifications obtained by family or social giving.
Assuming that a preference for taxing the donee, combined with a con-
cern about rate reduction through disguised consumption, explains the tax
treatment of ordinary gifts, then the charitable deduction is a proper allow-
ance in measuring the donor's disposable income. What about the system's
failure to follow through and tax the beneficiaries of charitable gifts? Can that
be explained as anything but a tax subsidy? Obviously any attempt to allocate
the benefits conferred by charitable organizations would quickly become hope-
less or arbitrary-who benefits, and in what degree, from basic scientific re-
search, or a liberal college education, or the community conscience instilled by
religious institutions? Two lines of reasoning indicate that the tax immunity of
charitable beneficiaries is not simply a concession to practicality, but is justi-
fied in principle. First, consider contributions to poverty relief organizations.
Current law does not require the value of food, shelter, or clothing distributed
by the relief organization to be included in the income of the recipient (section
102). Yet recipients of relief are very likely to be zero-bracket taxpayers, so
this divergence between theory and practice should have little effect.20 Second,
the wide variety of charitable institutions and activities in our society means
that we are all beneficiaries, more or less directly, of the services offered by
charitable institutions. If the hypothesis that all individuals consume charita-
ble goods and services in relatively equal amounts" is correct, then our tax
system does, in effect, tax the donees-taxing money income at the section 1
rates is simply a convenient surrogate for a less steeply graduated tax on total
income, including charitable services.2 Professor Andrews points out that, "A
community of people that supports a church will pay less in taxes than a com-
munity of people with the same total income, similarly distributed, that spends
less on its church and more on its private homes."'23 This statement, however,
assumes that each community has the same total money income and receives
no external benefits from charitable institutions supported by others. The ine-
quality in taxation is justified if, as seems likely, the community of
nonchurchgoing homeowners also has the benefit of hospitals, schools or parks
funded by contributors outside the community.
To summarize, the charitable deduction is a proper allowance in measur-
ing disposable income if the nondeductibility of ordinary gifts is founded upon
19. FILER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 128.
20. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV.
309, 347 (1972).
21. Actually, the distributional requirement is not that stringent. Equality in
the amount of charitable services consumed by taxpayers at the same income level is
all that is required. Differences between income levels could, in theory, be taken into
account in setting the rate schedule.
22. See H. SIMONS, supra note 14, at 52-53 (omission of leisure and psychic
income proper if "these elements of income vary with considerable regularity, from one
income class to the next, along the income scale").
23. Andrews, supra note 20, at 357.
1985]
5
Wiedenbeck: Wiedenbeck: Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
administrative convenience. If our guiding principle were that income is taxa-
ble to the person who consumes it (or who saves it), then all gifts would be
deductible by the donor and includable in the donee's gross income, except
insofar as enforcement limitations require departure from this principle. In
this view, current law's "general" tax treatment of donative transfers (taxable
to the donor, excludable by the donee) would be seen as an exception, a con-
cession to practicality necessary to take into account the ease with which con-
sumption may be disguised due to the absence of records or other objective
evidence showing the actual beneficiaries of a consumption expenditure. 4 Al-
though theoretically sound, the disguised consumption analysis is not entirely
consistent with present law, which follows the general principle that income is
taxable to the person who earns it,25 not to the person who actually consumes
it. Thus, the underlying premise of current law is that intangible consumption
or economic power 21 is a sufficient benefit to justify the imposition of a tax
upon the donor.2 7 Generally speaking, the satisfactions derived from charitable
24. The recordkeeping burdens and enforcement difficulties engendered by the
difference in deductibility between business and personal expenditures (e.g., I.R.C. §§
274, 280A, 280F (1982 & West Supp. 1985)) would be a drop in the bucket compared
to the taxpayer compliance problems and administrative inconvenience that would fol-
low from making tax rates turn upon the identity of the ultimate consumer.
25. This statement of the general principle is a paraphrase of Mr. Justice
Holmes in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930): "There is no doubt that the
statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not
be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised
26. On the equivalence of the "intangible consumption" and "economic power"
rationales, see supra note 18.
27. The early assignment-of-income cases often emphasize the importance, in
matters of taxation, of the control of economic resources. For example, in Corliss v.
Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930), Justice Holmes observed:
But taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it
is with actual command 6ver the property taxed-the actual benefit for which
the tax is paid . . . .The income that is subject to a man's unfettered com-
mand and that he is free to enjoy at his own option may be taxed to him as
his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not.
Id. at 378. To like effect is Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940). Moreover,
in Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), the Court seemed to acknowledge (in
dicta) that the intangible satisfaction associated with gift-giving is a sufficient basis for
taxation of the donor. In holding that a father's gift of unmatured interest coupons to
his son did not shift tax liability, the Court stated:
Such a use of his economic gain, the right to receive income, to procure a
satisfaction which can be obtained only by the expenditure of money or prop-
erty, would seem to be the enjoyment of the income whether the satisfaction
is the purchase of goods at the corner grocery, the payment of his debt there,
or such nonmaterial satisfactions as may result from the payment of a cam-
paign or community chest contribution, or a gift to his favorite son.
Id. at 117.
Of course, the holdings in the assignment-of-income cases do not refute a "dis-
guised consumption" rationale because the facts of these cases involve precisely the
kind of potential for abuse that would require departure from a "general" principle of
[Vol. 50
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contributions are not different in kind from those derived from other gifts. 25
Accordingly, under the prevailing concept of income, the better view is that
the charitable deduction is not a proper allowance in measuring disposable
income.
Apart from income measurement, are there tax policy considerations that
justify deductibility? Some commentators assert that the deduction is consis-
tent with income tax theory because it maintains horizontal equity. 9 Adopting
Professor Andrews' example, 30 compare a doctor who donates services by
working one day a week at a clinic in a poor neighborhood, with a tax lawyer
who must earn a fee and donate cash because an in-kind contribution of ser-
vices would not be useful to the clinic or the low-income patients it serves.
Because the doctor is not taxed on the value of the uncompensated services,
the argument goes, equity demands that the lawyer be allowed a deduction.
Conceding that horizontal equity requires consistent treatment of the doctor
and the lawyer, still there is another way to achieve that equal treatment. The
doctor could be required to include in gross income the value of the contrib-
uted services,31 without granting either the doctor or the lawyer an offsetting
taxing gifts to the donee. Since the broad language of those cases can generally be
dismissed as dicta, it is important to investigate whether our tax system really contains
a preference for the "intangible consumption" rationale. Although the matter deserves
further study, let me suggest several situations which, I believe, indicate a general pol-
icy of taxing income to the person who earns it, even where the disguised consumption
rationale might yield a different result. First, an outright gift is effective to shift liabil-
ity for tax on future income produced by the property to lower-bracket family members
(section 102(b)(1)) because the donee has control of the future income, even though he
may choose to use it to fund consumption by the original donor. Second, gifts to politi-
cal candidates and organizations are not deductible. Third, prior to the 1942 enactment
of the predecessors to sections 71 and 215, alimony was taxable to the payor. Gould v.
Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917).
28. In certain circumstances there may be significant differences between the
utility associated with some charitable contributions and other gifts (whether or not
charitable). It is possible that contributions to some donees (churches, for example) or
in some minimum amount are treated by many taxpayers as a moral imperative, and
thus represent a priority claim on the taxpayer's income. If so, the involuntary aspect
of these contributions distinguishes them from ordinary consumer spending, and mayjustify the deduction. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching
Grants?, 28 TAX L. REv. 37, 58-59 (1972). (This argument is similar to the considera-
tions which supl 3ort the allowance for extraordinary medical expenses. C. KAHN, PER-
SONAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 127-28 (1960); J. PECHMAN, FED-
ERAL TAX POLICY 87-89 (4th ed., 1983); Andrews, supra note 20, at 336-37.) This
involuntary expenditure argument is not a general rehabilitation of the income-mea-
surement rationale because it only applies to a limited class of charitable gifts. If over-
extended, this argument would equate charitable contributions with casualty losses, an
absurd proposition.
29. Andrews, supra, note 20, at 347-48; Bittker, supra note 28, at 59-60.
30. Andrews, supra note 20, at 347-48.
31. The value of services contributed to charity is very large. In 1973 nearly six
billion hours were donated to religious and charitable organizations. The value of this
contributed time is estimated to be about $29 billion, or slightly more than the total
1985]
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deduction. The question thus becomes, is there any policy reason for putting
both the doctor and the lawyer on the nontaxable side of the line?
Economic neutrality arguably justifies the tax-free treatment. That is, by
failing to tax donors of property or services, the choice that a taxpayer faces
between leisure and extra work on behalf of charity is not affected by tax
considerations. But why should we preserve a no-tax world in this limited area
when the income tax, by its very nature, is blatantly non-neutral in its effect
on the leisure/work decision?32 Only because, as a matter of social policy, not
tax policy, society wants to encourage charitable contributions.
Consider what would happen if both the doctor and the lawyer were taxed
on their contributions. Professor Andrews describes the phenomenon as
follows:
An income tax ordinarily operates to make a person reduce his expenditures
but leaves him free to decide for himself which expenditures to reduce by how
much. Taxable consumption includes both food and clothing; a taxpayer may
choose, however, to cast the burden of the tax wholly on one category in order
to avoid any reduction in the other. As among private preclusive consumption
expenditures the reduction will be distributed among items under the con-
straint that any particular expenditure reduction will immediately produce a
corresponding reduction in consumption benefits. In the case of contributions
there is no such immediate connection. Whether the services produced by a
charitable organization and enjoyed by a contributor will be reduced does not
depend immediately and solely on his contributions but on the sum of all con-
tributions by all contributors; thus a rationally self-interested taxpayer might
be tempted to let his contributions bear more of the burden of a tax than do
his private consumption expenditures. 3
The problem, of course, is that many contributors are likely to react this way,
and the consequence of this free-rider syndrome is likely to be a drastic reduc-
tion in private charitable giving. 34 Indeed, the charitable contribution deduc-
dollar value of contributions of money and property. Morgan, Dye & Hybels, Results
from Two National Surveys of Philanthroflic Activity in I FILER COMMISSION RE-
SEARCH PAPERS supra note 1, at 157, 160.
32. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 653-54 (4th ed. 1984); Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17
STAN. L. REV. 567, 586-88 (1965); see Hausman, Labor Supply, in How TAxES AF-
FECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 27, 61 (H. Aaron & J. Pechman eds. 1981) (empirical
estimate that the current tax system reduces the desired hours of work by 8.6% from
the labor supplied in a no-tax world).
33. Andrews, supra note 20, at 361.
34. If the increased revenues collected from the taxation of charitable contribu-
tions were returned to taxpayers in the form of an overall reduction of tax rates, the
matter is not so straightforward as indicated in the text. Under current law, an individ-
ual in the 50% tax bracket can contribute one dollar to charity at a cost to himself of
only fifty cents of foregone consumption. Without the deduction, the after-tax cost of
the same contribution would be the full one dollar. This "price effect" of the tax tends
to decrease contributions. At the same time, however, the tax rate reductions permitted
by eliminating the deduction would reduce the top marginal rate to, say, 47%. This tax
cut increases personal disposable income, making more money available to individuals
[Vol. 50
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tion was originally enacted to prevent exactly this problem.35
Hence, charitable donations are peculiarly susceptible to tax deterrence,
and the deduction preserves the delicate balance of motivations that support
social giving. Still the policy question remains: Why preserve social giving?
Consider the consequences of tax deterrence. A massive reduction in contribu-
tions would force charitable organizations to increase prices. Tuition at institu-
tions of higher education would rise36 and admission charges to theaters, con-
with which to make donations. This "income effect" tends to increase charitable giving.
The net effect of the tax law change on the amount of individual charitable contri-
butions depends on the relative strengths of the income and price effects, which cannot
be predicted a priori. These strengths-the responsiveness of donors to changes in af-
ter-tax income and the after-tax price of giving-are economic quantities known as
income and price elasticities. Empirical estimates of these quantities are set forth in
note 41, infra. Since the revenue cost of the individual charitable contribution deduc-
tion (approximately $13.5 billion in fiscal year 1985) is about five percent of current
individual income tax collections ($278 billion in 1982), nondeductibility would permit
only a small rate reduction. Under these circumstances, the elasticity estimates indicate
that the price effect will indeed predominate, and a large reduction in giving could be
expected.
It should also be noted that even without a change in deductibility, any change in
tax rates produces countervailing income and price effects. A general rate reduction,
for example, raises the price of giving (greater foregone consumption) but also in-
creases disposable income available for donations. The best available estimates of in-
come and price elasticities indicate that the net effect on charitable giving of an overall
rate reduction (such as those proposed as a component of current comprehensive in-
come tax proposals) would be a substantial reduction in contributions. E.g., Clotfelter,
Tax Reform and Charitable Giving in 1985, 26 TAx NOTES 477 (1985).
35. A charitable contribution deduction was proposed during consideration of
the Revenue Act of 1913 by the House of Representatives. Supporters of the allowance
argued that "it is desirable that there should be no curtailment imposed by this act
upon the benevolent members of the community." 50 CONG. REc. 1259 (1913) (state-
ment of Rep. Rogers). Although rejected in 1913, when the top marginal rate of the
income tax was seven percent, it was enacted as section 1201(2) of the Revenue Act of
1917, supra note 11, which dramatically increased rates (up to 52% in 1917) to help
pay for America's entry into World War I. In 1917 the deduction was explicitly pro-
moted as a means of reducing the deterrent effect of high tax rates on contributions to
charity.
It will work in this way: Usually people contribute to charities and edu-
cational objects out of their surplus. After they have done everything else they
want to do, after they have educated their children and traveled and spent
their money on everything they really want or think they want, then if they
have something left over, they will contribute it to a college or to the Red
Cross or for some scientific purposes. Now, when war comes and we impose
these very heavy taxes on incomes, that will be the first place where the
wealthy men will be tempted to economize, namely, in donations to charity.
They will say, "Charity begins at home."
55 CONG. REc. 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hollis).
36. Data indicate that in 1974, of every $10 spent by privately controlled non-
profit educational institutions, about $3 came from private philanthropy, $5 came from
user fees (i.e., tuition) and endowment income, and $1 came from governmental
sources. Corresponding estimates of 1974 funding sources for $10 in outlays by health
9
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certs, and museums would go up sharply.37 Services provided by charitable
organizations that are now in the nature of "public goods" (below-cost services
that may be utilized by many people without regard to whether they have
contributed to the institution) might become available only to those who could
afford to pay a price reflecting the full cost of providing such services.
Alternatively, the reduction in private giving might induce the govern-
ment to step in with direct budget outlays to hospitals, colleges, museums, etc.,
to prevent this "privatization" of services. This response would be based on a
social policy decision that such cultural and educational opportunities should
be available to a broader segment of society than their free market pricing
would permit. Such a direct government subsidy program would, of course, be
funded through the tax system.
Thus, if charitable contributions could be made only out of the after-tax
income of the donor, society might be forced to decide between a distribution
of services determined by free market pricing and the broader access to cul-
tural, educational, and medical services that would result from government-
subsidized prices (cost spreading through the tax and appropriations pro-
cess). 38 It was observed earlier that horizontal equity between donors of ser-
vices and donors of property could be achieved by either taxing both or taxing
neither. It should now be apparent that allowance of the charitable contribu-
tion deduction-taxing neither-necessarily entails a social policy decision
that a free market distribution of education (and other services currently pro-
vided by charitable organizations) would not be in the public interest. The
institutions are: $1 from private philanthropy, $5 from user fees (e.g., hospital fees)
and endowment income, and $4 from government. Rudney, The Scope of Private Vol-
untary Charitable Sector, in I FILER COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 1, at
135, 136-38. The lesser role of philanthropy in health affairs is a reflection of an enor-
mous post-World War II increase in public support of medical research and health care
funding. Blendon, The Changing Role of Private Philanthropy in Health Affairs, in II
FILER COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 1, at 639, 643.
37. In 1970-71, ticket sales to theaters, symphonies, operas, and ballet ac-
counted for approximately 46-64% of expenditures, depending on the art form. Admis-
sion charges to museums covered only 30% of operating revenues. In the performing
arts (theater, symphony, opera and ballet), total private contributions ranged from
three to eight times greater, depending on the art form, than total governmental grants.
If capital grants are excluded, private philanthropy is more than five times as impor-
tant as government funding in making up the shortfall in operating revenue in the
performing arts. Hightower, A Report on the Arts, in II FILER COMMIssION RESEARCH
PAPERS, supra note 1, at 713, 719-22.
38. The situation is not quite as clear-cut as indicated in the text. In some fields
of traditional philanthropic endeavor, particularly health and welfare, the government
has already become a major source of funding. Rudney, supra note 36, at 136; Win-
ston, Some Aspects of Private Philanthropy in Relation to Social Welfare, in II FILER
COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 1, at 677, 679-80. In other fields, govern-
ment involvement remains small (e.g., arts and culture) or nonexistent (e.g., religion).
In any event, increased governmental support, even in the fields of health, welfare, and
education, is a recent phenomenon (since World War II) and cutbacks in federal
spending may reverse this trend.
[Vol. 50
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charitable contribution deduction is a tax expenditure (an indirect subsidy)
rather than a proper allowance in measuring disposable income because it is a
substitute for taxing contributors and making up for the reduction in private
giving by direct budget outlays.39
2. Mechanism for Implementing Policy
Thus, the deduction for charitable contributions must ultimately find its
justification in nontax social policy considerations. This fact does not mean
that the allowance is inappropriate or unwise. It means only that the wisdom
of the tax expenditure must be evaluated by comparing its effectiveness with
the alternative--direct budget outlays. Although this evaluation is a complex
process and expert opinion is divided on the issue, three considerations indicate
that in this field the tax expenditure may be preferable.
First, a tax incentive to encourage private support for the services tradi-
tionally provided by charitable organizations may be necessary in part because
of constitutional restraints on government action. The first amendment forbids
government aid to religious organizations, but benefit to an individual donor-
taxpayer through the general charitable contribution deduction does not vio-
late the establishment clause.
40
Second, the best available economic research indicates that the tax deduc-
tion is efficient. That is, deductibility increases gifts to charity by more than it
decreases tax collections! 41 If this empirical evidence is correct, it is the direct
39. It must be remembered that the conclusion that the charitable contribution
deduction is a tax expenditure is the result of the assumption that ordinary gifts should
be taxable to the donor (as intangible consumption) rather than the donee. As observed
earlier, this assumption is not the only possible rationale for section 102. The deduction
is a proper allowance in measuring net income under the alternative (disguised con-
sumption) rationale. Since neither view of the matter is clearly incorrect, differences in
tax treatment resulting from a "tax expenditure" label should be viewed with suspicion.
See infra text accompanying notes 65-68, 162-66, 173-81.
40. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) (property tax exemp-
tion of nonprofit charitable organizations constitutional despite financial benefit to
churches); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-9 (1978); see also Muel-
ler v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding limited tax deduction allowed parents for
expenses associated with their childrens' attendance at any school-public, private, or
parochial).
Aside from constitutional limits, there may also be important practical limits on
the goals which government can achieve through a direct subsidy. See infra notes 42-
43 and accompanying text.
41. FILER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 129. In economic terms, the
results of several recent studies show that the price elasticity of charitable giving is
negative and has an absolute value slightly greater than unity (for an explanation of
income and price elasticities, see supra note 34). Feldstein & Taylor, The Income Tax
and Charitable Contributions: Estimates and Simulations With the Treasury Tax
Files, in III FILER COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 1, at 1419, 1423-24
(price elasticity = -1.285, income elasticity = 0.702); Feldstein & Clotfelter, Tax
Incentives and Charitable Contributions in the United States: A Microeconomic Anal-
ysis, in id. at 1393, 1397-1400 (price elasticity = -1.15, income elasticity = 0.87);
Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part I-Aggregate and Dis-
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expenditure alternative that could not survive a cost/benefit analysis.
Third, the charitable contribution deduction encourages cultural and asso-
ciational pluralism. Governmental priorities are established democratically,
which may lead to a tyranny of the majority. For example, if the voting popu-
lation likes public TV but doesn't like fine art or music, government-only sup-
port through the tax and appropriation process would result in a uniform, per-
haps stifling, set of cultural and educational opportunities. 42 The charitable
tributional Effects, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 81, 86-90 (1975) (price elasticity = -1.238, in-
come elasticity = 0.822). An earlier study which suggested that charitable giving was
not responsive to deductibility (Taussig, Economic Aspects of the Personal Income
Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 6 (1967)) has been
much criticized and now appears unreliable. E.g., Bittker, supra note 28, at 49-52;
Feldstein, supra, at 97-98. An excellent review of these studies and new estimates
(price elasticity = -1.27, income elasticity = 0.78) are presented by Clotfelter &
Steuerle, Charitable Contributions, in How TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 403,
424-25 (H. Aaron & J. Pechman eds. 1981). But see Rudney, Charitable Deductions
and Tax Reform: New Evidence on Giving Behavior, 26 TAX NOTES 367 (1985) (criti-
cizing earlier studies and estimating a price elasticity of only -0.69 for taxpayers with
less than $100,000 income). A negative price elasticity with absolute value greater than
one produces a curious result: repeal of the deduction would deter contributions to such
an extent that despite the tax increase many taxpayers would experience an increase in
disposable income! Break, Charitable Contributions Under the Federal Individual In-
come Tax: Alternative Policy Options, in III FILER COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS,
supra note 1, at 1521, 1530.
Moreover, Martin Feldstein has shown that if taxpayers reduce their private giv-
ing in response to government expenditures on charitable activities, then a tax subsidy
which increases giving by less than its revenue cost (i.e., absolute value of price elastic-
ity less than one) may still be more efficient than the direct expenditure. Feldstein, A
Contribution to the Theory of Tax Expenditures: The Case of Charitable Giving, in
THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 99, 105-06 (H. Aaron & M. Boskin eds. 1980); see
Abrams & Schmitz, The Crowding-Out Effect of Governmental Transfers on Private
Charitable Contributions: Cross-Section Evidence, 37 NAT'L TAX J. 563 (1984).
One further observation concerning the efficiency of the deduction is in order. A
complete cost/benefit analysis would take into account the transaction costs associated
with alternative mechanisms of funding charitable institutions. Most charitable organi-
zations devote a substantial portion of their budget to fund-raising. Grimes, The Fund-
Raising Percent as a Quantitative Standard for Regulation of Public Charities with
Particular Emphasis on Voluntary Health and Welfare Organizations, in V FILER
COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 1, at 2889, 2891-93 (for many organiza-
tions the ratio of total fund-raising expenses to total contributions and grants is in the
range 10-35%); see FILER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 174, 176-78 (recom-
mending disclosure of solicitation costs to IRS and federal regulation of interstate
fund-raising solicitations). It is possible that the transaction costs associated with a
direct subsidy program might be substantially lower, thus rendering the spending pro-
gram more cost effective.
42. The author has observed in another context:
[T]here may be a class of meritorious social programs now administered
through the tax system that, as a political matter, could not be transplanted
from the tax to the spending side of the federal budget. In general, these
politically fragile programs are subsidies which benefit a nonneedy minority
of the taxpaying population. Their goals may be politically unachievable
[Vol. 50
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contribution deduction may reflect a judgment that pluralism is to be valued
highly in its own right. The deduction encourages pluralism by permitting an
assortment of social services; taxpayers are allowed in part to vote with their
dollars,43 rather than by the one-person, one-vote system that establishes tax
and budget priorities. The preservation of residual sovereignty in the states
under our federalist system of government is sometimes justified because it
maintains the states as a laboratory of democracy.44 Similarly, the charitable
contribution deduction fosters the coexistence of nonmajoritarian values-it
encourages experimentation by the private sector in new solutions to our social
problems.45
It must be recognized that a direct outlay program could be designed that
would also promote pluralism by allowing citizens to vote with their dollars.
Congress could enact a matching grant system, for example. Yet the reduced
political visibility of a subsidy provided through the tax system may be an
important advantage. 48 That the charitable contribution deduction partakes of
under a candid spending program because such a subsidy would be perceived
by voters as a plan of redistribution from the majority to a minority of the
middle class.
Wiedenbeck, Paternalism and Income Tax Reform, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. - (1985).
43. Studies indicate that almost all American households contribute time and/
or money to religious or charitable organizations, and that sympathy with the purposes
of the donee organization and personal involvement are highly correlated with giving.
Morgan, Dye & Hybels, supra note 31, at 160, 198-207.
44. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting):
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibil-
ity. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious conse-
quences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a labora-
tory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.
See also L. TRIBE, supra note 40, § 5-22, at 311-12.
45. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON THE ARTS & HUMANITIES, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 18 (Oct. 1981):
The use of the tax mechanism for support of charitable endeavors generally,
and for the arts and humanities specifically, ensures choice of the recipient by
the private donor. The tax system thus provides for pluralism, both through
the range of arts and humanities activities supported and through the diver-
sity of sources of such support.
FILER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 123:
By saying with his or her own dollars what needs should be met, what objec-
tives pursued, what values served, every contributor exercises, in a profound
sense, a form of self-government, a form that parallels, complements and en-
riches the democratic electoral process itself.
Accord Bittker, supra note 28, at 61-62 (donor's ability to select the social services
they support may reduce alienation toward government).
46. The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs observed:
Another major virtue of the deduction is its relative insulation from polit-
ical or bureaucratic manipulation. Compared with other forms of encourage-
ment such as matching grants, the deduction as a mechanism is not subject to
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the "protective coloration" of the tax code may be the most effective method
of defending pluralism against the onslaughts of political opportunism."
Professor Bittker is the most able proponent of this view.
When a donor takes a tax deduction for a charitable contribution his
privacy is an inextricable part of the more generally protected privacy that is
accorded to federal income tax returns. Thus, an attempt to breach it-for
example, on the theory that deductions are equivalent to expenditures and
that the public is entitled to know who is controlling the destiny of these hy-
pothetical public funds-would be seen as a threat to the privacy of every-
one's tax return. By contrast, a promise of privacy embodied in a matching
grant system, not yet sanctified or steeled by history, would not be protected
by a similar umbrella, and might well be swept away by a revival of Mc-
Carthyism, aided perhaps by a philosophic claim (already explicit in some
proposals to substitute grants for deductions) that secrecy is incompatible
with democratic values ....
A closely related threat to the independence of donors and donees is the
intrusion of official concepts of right and wrong into administration of a
matching grant system. No public program is immune to either open or covert
attempts to foster one set of values and discourage another, but the definition
of exempt organizations by section 501(c)(3) of the Code and the administra-
tion of this definition by the tax authorities have been relatively free of bias.
This freedom is fragile, of course, and it would be fatuous to assert that it will
last so long as we stick with tax deductions, but will be lost forever if we shift
to matching grants ....
. . . The issue, after all, is not in drafting a verbal formula promising
independence, but its effect in real life. Acknowledging that a dogmatic con-
clusion is not warranted, I must say that I have very little confidence that a
system of matching grants could be administered without administrative and
congressional investigations, loyalty oaths, informal or explicit warnings
fine-tuning to fit administratively or legislatively determined goals. It thus
leaves the greatest leeway to individual, as contrasted to collective, determina-
tion of giving patterns, and this is seen as being of decisive importance in
maintaining the pluralistic role that the nonprofit sector should play ....
Matching grants and credits are also, the Commission feels, more suscep-
tible to political manipulation because they can be seen to involve government
funds. Matching grants in fact would flow directly from the Treasury.
FILER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 130, 132. In addition, a survey of prac-
tices in other countries concluded that "governmental supervision and regulation of
private charitable organizations exists to some degree in all of the [eight developed]
countries [studied], with particular emphasis on organizations receiving direct govern-
mental grants." Arthur Andersen & Co., Overview of Governmental Support and Fi-
nancial Regulation of Philanthropic Organizations in Selected Nations, in V FILER
COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 1, at 2975.
47. Professor Surrey suggests that "the preference for the hidden subsidy over
the open subsidy" may be a reason why some prefer tax expenditure programs to direct
budget outlays. He concludes, however, that this approach frustrates efforts to achieve
a rational use of resources and "should not be accepted." Surrey, Tax Incentives as a
Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government
Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 733-34 (1970).
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against heterodoxy and the other trappings of governmental support that the
tax deduction has, so far, been able to escape.48
Studies indicate that the IRS has generally been evenhanded in its regulation
of charitable institutions. The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public
Needs recommended that the Service continue to be the principal agency re-
sponsible for oversight of tax-exempt organizations.4 9
Even if one accepts the tax allowance as camouflage-a practical expedi-
ent to protect pluralism from a short-sighted or repressive majority-one may
still oppose the deduction mechanism because it operates as an income-depen-
dent subsidy. Because the after-tax cost of any deductible expenditure is pro-
portional to the quantity 1-t, where t is the taxpayer's marginal rate, the gov-
ernment shoulders more of the burden of high-income taxpayers'
contributions. The very poor, for example, forgo one dollar of consumption for
each dollar they drop in the church plate, but a forty percent taxpayer suffers
only sixty cents of foregone consumption when he gives a dollar. Therefore,
the charitable contribution deduction is often criticized as an "upside-down"
subsidy,50 because government assistance (foregone taxes) increases as the
need for such assistance decreases. Thus, citizens are permitted to vote with
their dollars, but the government unfairly weights their votes. A tax credit
makes the after-tax cost of an expenditure independent of income (at least if
the credit is refundable),5" so critics of the income-variant effect of the deduc-
48. Bittker, supra note 28, at 45-46.
49. FILER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 167:
The Commission has considered numerous proposals to substitute an-
other agency for the Internal Revenue Service in overseeing the affairs of
exempt organizations. Among the reasons given for an alternate agency was
the greater assurance of insulation of the nonprofit sector from political or
executive branch interference. The Commission was not persuaded that a via-
ble alternate to the Internal Revenue Service exists and was, in fact, satisfied
that, except in several isolated instances, the Service has demonstrated its ca-
pacity for independent, impartial oversight of tax-exempt organizations in-
cluding determination of exempt status.
Accord Ginsburg, Marks & Wertheim, Federal Oversight of Private Philanthropy, in
V FILER COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 1, at 2575, 2613-19; Persons, Os-
born & Feldman, Criteria for Exemption Under Section 501 (c)(3), in IV FILER COM-
MISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 1, at 1909, 1936-37, 1939-43.
50. See, e.g., Surrey, supra note 47, at 720-25.
51. To compare the value of a deduction and a credit, assume that two taxpay-
ers, TPA and TPB, are in the 50% and 11% marginal tax brackets, respectively. Each
has $100 of gross income and is evaluating the tax consequences of contributing this
amount to charity. The following table shows the after-tax cost of a $100 charitable
contribution made by each of these taxpayers, assuming (1) that the contribution is
deductible, and (2) that the contribution is eligible for a 25% refundable tax credit.
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tion often propose the substitution of a tax credit.52
A complete response to this criticism cannot be given here, but three im-
portant considerations deserve mention. First, taxpayer responsiveness to the
incentive may vary with income. Tax consciousness certainly does.53 If so, tax
benefits granted to taxpayers whose contribution behavior is unaffected may
be viewed simply as wasted revenue. That is, the deduction may be more effi-
cient as a tax incentive than a credit would be, if the income-variant effect of
the deduction operates to target benefits on the marginal contribution
Gross Amount Charit 25% After-Tax Cost of
Income Contrib Deduct Tax Credit Funds Contrib
No
Contribution
TPA 100 0 0 50 0 50 N/A
TPB 100 0 0 11 0 89 N/A
Deductible
Contribution
TPA 100 100 100 0 N/A 0 50
TPB 100 100 100 0 N/A 0 89
Creditable
Contribution
TPA 100 100 N/A 50 25 -25 75
TPB 100 100 N/A 11 25 14 75
Where:
After-Tax Funds = Gross Income - Amount Contributed - Tax + Credit; and
Cost of Contribution = After-Tax Funds (No Contribution) - After-Tax Funds
(With Contribution).
From the taxpayer's viewpoint, the cost of the contribution is the reduction in personal
funds that results from the gift, and in the case of a (refundable) credit this reduction
is the same for all taxpayers-the cost of a creditable expenditure is independent of the
taxpayer's marginal rate. Notice that in the case of a partial credit any taxpayer whose
marginal rate exceeds the creditable percentage would be better off with a deduction,
and any taxpayer whose marginal rate is less than the credit rate will prefer the credit.
52. E.g., Asher, Public Needs, Public Policy, and Philanthropy: An Analysis of
the Basic Issues and Their Treatment by the Commission on Private Philanthropy and
Public Needs, in II FILER COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 1, at 1069,
1084-85; Surrey, supra note 47, at 720-24. Although the majority favored the charita-
ble contribution deduction, the report of the Commission on Private Philanthropy and
Public Needs observed:
Commission members favoring tax credits tended to be persuaded in this
direction mainly by the fact that, unlike the deduction, credits operate inde-
pendently of the progressive structure of the income tax and therefore provide
the same proportionate tax savings to all taxpayers regardless of their income.
Under a 25 per cent credit, for instance, every taxpayer could subtract 25 per
cent of his contributions from the taxes he or she owes. This uniformity of
inducement was seen by some Commission members as being more equitable
than the deduction and was considered preferable for this reason.
FILER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 139.
53. Morgan, Dye & Hybels, supra note 31, at 175-78, 184-85.
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Second, the deduction may in fact reflect an implicit judgment that, in
general, the charitable goals of the rich are "better" or more socially useful
than programs supported by the poor. 55 Most charitable contributions by low-
income families go to their local religious congregation, while high-income
groups devote a greater proportion of their gifts to educational institutions,
hospitals, and the arts.56 Although substitution of a twenty-five percent credit
would not significantly affect aggregate charitable giving, it would have a dra-
matic impact on the distribution of contributions. The increased cost of contri-
butions for taxpayers in marginal tax brackets greater than twenty-five per-
cent would cause a dramatic decrease in contributions to higher education and
cultural organizations, while the increased subsidy for lower-income taxpayers
would cause religious gifts to rise.
57
Third, even if as a matter of fairness the income-variant effect of the
charitable contribution deduction is undesirable, it must be remembered that a
principal purpose of the tax allowance is to hide the subsidy. A tax credit,
though evenhanded, is generally recognized as a means of government assis-
tance, rather than as a proper allowance in the measurement of disposable
income. In part because of this difference in perceptions, the Commission on
Private Philanthropy and Public Needs rejected both the matching-grant and
tax credit alternatives to the charitable contribution deduction.
Matching grants and credits are also, the Commission feels, more suscep-
tible to political manipulation because they can be seen to involve government
funds. Matching grants in fact would flow directly from the Treasury. And
54. See Bittker, supra note 28, at 53. Empirical studies have yielded estimates
of the income and price elasticities of charitable giving. The data reveal that price
elasticity (i.e., donor responsiveness to the net after-tax cost of giving) does not vary
significantly through a wide range of incomes. It is estimated that the substitution of a
25% credit would yield approximately the same total aggregate giving at the same
revenue cost as the current deduction, even though the credit would present the same
cost of giving to all taxpayers. Thus, the best available data do not seem to indicate
that, relative to a credit, a deduction yields more giving per dollar of foregone revenue.
Feldstein & Taylor, supra note 41, at 1419, 1429-31, 1433-36; Feldstein & Clotfelter,
supra note 41, at 1393, 1403-07, 1411-12; Feldstein, supra note 41, at 88-90. Professor
Feldstein summarized the results of these studies with the observation: "Since the
econometric evidence indicates that the price elasticity of giving is approximately mi-
nus one and does not differ significantly among income groups, the total cost in terms
of foregone tax revenues is essentially independent of the method used to stimulate
contributions." Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part
I1-The Impact on Religious, Educational and Other Organizations, 28 NAT'L TAX J.
209, 209-10 (1975).
55. See FILER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 132-33; Feldstein, The
Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part II-The Impact on Religious, Educa-
tional and Other Organizations, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 209, 225 (1975); infra text accompa-
nying notes 112-16.
56. Morgan, Dye & Hybels, supra note 31, at 208.
57. Feldstein, supra note 55, at 224; Feldstein & Taylor, supra note 41, at
1436.
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the government can reasonably be considered to have an equally strong claim
to funds involved in tax credits, because such funds would otherwise have to
be paid in taxes. 8
With this background on the history and policy of the charitable contri-
bution deduction, the article will turn now to an analysis of the statutory
provisions.
B. Eligible Donees and Purposes
1. TP, our hypothetical taxpayer, is the owner of a large tract of unde-
veloped real estate in the City of Columbia. TP gave the city a strip of land to
be used for a street extension. Can TP deduct the value of the donated prop-
erty? Section 170(c)(1).
Dedicating this strip of land to the city is clearly a gift to a political
subdivision of the state as required by section 170(c)(1), but the issue in this
case is whether the gift has been made for exclusively public purposes. If, as
seems likely, the donation to the city will benefit TP's land, perhaps permitting
him to subdivide the tract, then the personal benefit to TP makes this gift
nondeductible. The requirement that the gift to a governmental unit be made
for "exclusively public purposes" is the analog of section 164(c). A special
assessment, levied against property to pay for curbs and gutters, for example,
is not deductible as a tax because of the direct benefit to the property owner.
Similarly, section 170(c)(1) requires that to be deductible as a charitable con-
tribution the expenditure must be made for the exclusive benefit of the govern-
mental unit, not to advance the private interest of the donor.
2. TP wrote a $50 check to the Lions Club. 9 Can he deduct this
amount? What result if the check was made out to "Lions Club Leader Dog
Program"? Section 170(c)(4).
The unconditional gift of $50 to the Lions Club is nondeductible because
section 170(c)(4) also contains an exclusive use requirement. It is easy to see
why Congress imposed such a limitation. The provision of meals, social, and
recreational opportunities for members is a large part of the activities of most
fraternities. Individuals cannot deduct their own food and entertainment costs,
and the same result applies if they join together with others in a fraternity.
Because payments to the fraternity support the consumption activities of its
members, they are nondeductible. On the other hand, if the gift is restricted to
use in the provision of leader dogs for the blind, it is devoted exclusively to an
exempt charitable activity, and the deduction would be allowed.
58. FILER COMMISSION REPORT, supra, note 15, at 132. See generally
Wiedenbeck, supra note 42.
59. The names of specific organizations are used in this and other problems to
provide familiar examples of fact situations which arguably raise the legal issues dis-
cussed. All problems are hypothetical, and no inference should be made concerning the
actual structure or operations of the organizations mentioned.
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3.A. TP sends a $200 check to the University of Toronto. Is he entitled
to a deduction? Section 170(c)(2)(A). What result if TP writes the check to
the University of Toronto American Donors Fund, a New York charitable
trust which annually distributes all of its assets to the University of Toronto?
Why the difference in result?
If TP sends the $200 check directly to the University of Toronto, the
contribution will be nondeductible. 60 Assuming that the University is a Cana-
dian corporation, it fails to meet the requirements of section 170(c)(2)(A) be-
cause it is not created or organized under the laws of the United States or of
any state.
Contrast the result when TP sends the check to the University of Toronto
American Donors Fund. Here, since the fund is a New York charitable trust,
it is created or organized under the laws of a state, and the gift should be
deductible. But why this difference in outcome, when the activities supported
by the contributions will be exactly the same? This result can be explained by
examining the other requirements for deductibility under section 170(c)(2). In
addition to being created under U.S. law, an organization eligible to receive
tax-deductible contributions must also be organized and operated exclusively
for educational purposes, no part of its net earnings may inure to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of its activities may
consist of attempts to influence legislation, and in no event may the organiza-
tion participate or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of any candi-
date for public office. How will the IRS assure that these conditions are satis-
fied in the case of a contribution to an organization located outside the United
States? The IRS has no authority to audit a foreign entity that has no contact
with the United States.61 Section 170(c)(2)(A) permits enforcement by assur-
ing that the IRS will have the ability to examine the books and records of a
donee that is within United States' tax jurisdiction. In our hypothetical, the
IRS will be able to examine the books and records of the American Donors
Fund, the New York charitable trust. The burden will be on the American
60. In certain limited circumstances, this result is changed by treaty. Beginning
in 1985, United States citizens and residents may deduct contributions made directly to
a college or university organized in Canada at which the donor or a member of her
family was enrolled. Other donations to charities organized in Canada are not deducti-
ble against U.S.-source income. Income Tax Treaty, signed Sept. 26, 1980, United
States-Canada, art. XXI, 5, - U.S.T. -, -, T.I.A.S. No. -, at - (approved
by Senate June 28, 1984, 130 CONG. REC. S8573 (daily ed. June 28, 1984); instru-
ments of ratification exchanged by the contracting States Aug. 16, 1984); see Diplo-
matic Letter from G. William Miller, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, to Allan J.
MacEachen, Minister of Finance of Canada (Sept. 26, 1980) (confirming contracting
States' understanding that the donor's "family" means brothers and sisters (whether by
whole or half blood or by adoption), spouse, ancestors, lineal descendants, and adopted
descendants).
61. As a practical matter, the extremely broad summons power of the IRS,
I.R.C § 7602 (1982), is limited by the jurisdiction of the district courts to enforce a
summons, id. §§ 7402(b), 7604, which is subject to constitutional due process require-
ments. E.g., United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 561 F. Supp. 354 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
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Donors Fund to show that it is operated exclusively for educational purloses,
and it will satisfy its burden by showing the nature of the University of To-
ronto educational programs that its annual distributions support.
3.B. What result if TP's wholly-owned corporation makes a $200 con-
tribution to the University of Toronto American Donors Fund? Section
170(c)(2), penultimate sentence. What if TP's corporation makes the contri-
bution but the American Donors Fund is a New York nonprofit corporation?
A contribution to the University of Toronto American Donors Fund, if
made by TP's wholly-owned corporation, will be nondeductible. Although the
contribution is to a trust created under U.S. law, an additional requirement is
prescribed in cases where the donor is a corporation. A gift in trust by a cor-
porate donor is deductible only if the money is to be used inside the United
States. The reason that the Code imposes a U.S.-use requirement for contribu-
tions by corporations, but not for individual donations, is not entirely clear.6 2
This additional requirement may reflect concern for individual constitutional
rights. For example, it would be clearly inappropriate to restrict an individ-
ual's right to support religion because his denomination is headquartered
outside the United States.63 Alternatively, the U.S.-use requirement may re-
62. A general domestic use requirement would follow quite naturally from the
perspective which holds the charitable contribution deduction to be a tax subsidy, be-
cause direct government provision of services in lieu of the deduction would probably
extend only to the border. Indeed, the principle that the tax allowance should be lim-
ited to the same extent as the public expenditure alternative was influential in the de-
velopment of section 170, but incredibly, this idea provided the original (misguided)
motivation for the U.S.-organization requirement, not the U.S.-use requirement. H.R.
REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19-20 (1938). Despite the consistency of a domes-
tic use requirement with the tax expenditure analysis, the subsidy view fails to suggest
any distinction between corporate and individual donations.
Certain state income tax laws prohibit or restrict the deductibility of contributions
which support charitable activities outside the state. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.21.3(d)
(West Supp. 1984) (corporate charitable contributions to organizations which do not
carry on substantially all of their activities within Minnesota deductible only in propor-
tion to Minnesota taxable net income; in taxable years beginning before 1983, restric-
tion also applied to individuals); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-147(15), (16) (Supp. 1983)(no limit on contributions to the state, its political subdivisions or instrumentalities; also
no limit on gifts to educational institutions or nonprofit hospitals located within North
Carolina; contributions to other charities limited to 15% of adjusted gross income); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 12-7-700(10) (1976) (20% adjusted gross income limit on individuals'
charitable contributions, raised to 30% for gifts to churches, educational institutions,
hospitals, and medical research organizations "situate in this State"); see also id. § 12-
7-700(5) (limits on corporate contributions); accord D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-
1803.3(a)(8) (Supp. 1984) (activities must be "carried on to a substantial extent in the
District").
63. Conditioning the deductibility of religious contributions on the situs of the
church might violate the establisment clause. Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 254-
55 (1982) (financial reporting obligations imposed on religious organizations that re-
ceive more than 50% of their contributions from nonmembers creates unconstitutional
political entanglement). Similarly, IRS audits of domestic religious organizations to
ascertain that contributions are not being used outside the United States might create a
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flect a sense that because corporations are licensed to exploit the U.S. econ-
omy, it is fair to require that any deductible gift of corporate profits should
benefit this economy. There is a problem with this analysis, however. Note
that section 170(c)(2) applies the U.S.-use requirement only to a contribution
from a corporation to a trust, chest, fund or foundation-it does not apply to a
contribution from a corporation to a corporation. Thus, if the University of
Toronto American Donors Fund were a New York corporation rather than a
trust, TP's wholly-owned corporation could claim the deduction notwithstand-
ing the foreign use. The failure to apply the U.S.-use requirement to corporate
donees apparently derives from a drafting error, 6' but it is a longstanding and
well-recognized drafting error. Therefore, if one were asked to organize the
Lebanon War Relief Society, it would be wise to elect a domestic corporation
as the form of organization, as this would permit the Society to solicit tax-
deductible contributions both from individuals and corporations.
4. TP makes a $200 gift to a local Cambodian refugee family to assist
in their resettlement. Can he deduct this amount? Consider the implications
of sections 262 and 151(e). What result if TP makes the contribution to the
church that sponsored the refugee family to be used for the same purpose?
Can TP make a deductible gift to the church to be used to increase the pas-
tor's salary, where TP's brother is pastor?
The section 170(c) definition of "charitable contribution" includes only
gifts to governmental units and qualified organizations, not to specific individ-
risk of excessive administrative entanglement. See L. TRIBE, supra note 40, § 14-12, at
865-70. Whether the free exercise clause would require that religions be excepted from
an across-the-board prohibition on the use of charitable contributions outside the
United States is far from clear. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234
(1972) (first and fourteenth amendments prohibit state from requiring high school edu-
cation of Amish children) with United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (free
exercise clause does not prohibit mandatory employer participation in social security).
See generally Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Phi-
losophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 847, 877-903 (1984). Note, however,
that state income tax laws which limit the deductibility of contributions to out-of-state
charities (discussed in note 62, supra) have apparently never been challenged.
64. The distinction between incorporated and unincorporated donees dates back
to the 1935 extension of the deduction to corporate contributors. Revenue Act of 1935,
ch. 829, § 102(c), 49 Stat. 1014, 1016. The corporate deduction was adopted (over
strong objections from the Roosevelt Administration) as a floor amendment to the Rev-
enue Act of 1935 sponsored by the Ways and Means Committee, but there was no
discussion of the technical language of the provision. 79 CONG. REC. 12422-24 (1935);
S. REP. No. 1240, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, & Part 2 at 4, 7 (1935). In 1942 the
Senate voted to repeal the U.S.-use requirement, apparently to encourage private phi-
lanthropy to assist with the foreign aid necessitated by the war effort. See S. REP. No.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1942). However, the bill agreed to in conference reim-
posed the restriction on corporate-donor/unincorporated-donee transfers as of the end
of hostilities. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 125, 56 Stat. 798, 822. In 1948, the
House voted to lift permanently the U.S.-use requirement, but the Senate did not act
on the bill. H.R. REP. No. 2087, 80th Cong. 2d Sess. 34 (1948) (discussing § 113(b)(1)
of the 1948 Revenue Revision Bill, H.R. 6712).
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uals, however needy. Accordingly, TP's gift to the local Cambodian refugee
family does not qualify. Section 102 sets forth the general rule that gifts are
not income to the donee, but to assure that all income will be taxed once,
neither are they deductible by the donor. Personal, living, or family expenses
are not deductible; a taxpayer's only allowance for such costs is the $1000
personal exemption of section 151(e), which can be claimed only for certain
relatives and members of the taxpayer's household, and then only if the tax-
payer provides more than one-half of their support. The organizational-donee
requirement of section 170(c) assures that these limitations cannot be circum-
vented, and avoids the administrative problems that would attend a rule mak-
ing deductibility turn on a distinction between gifts to truly needy individuals
and gifts motivated by friendship or kinship. The charitable organization's se-
lection of beneficiaries tends to provide independent assurance that deductible
contributions are supporting a worthy cause, and IRS oversight of operations
is designed to assure that tax-exempt organizations confer a public benefit
rather than serving the personal, private interests of the founder, major con-
tributors, or other interested parties. Thus, if TP makes his gift to the church
that sponsored the refugee family, it should be deductible.
But what if TP makes a gift to the church to be used to increase the
salary of the pastor, his brother? Here, TP may be using the church as a
conduit to make a personal gift to his brother, in which case no deduction
should be allowed. This example demonstrates that although a taxpayer may
specify the purposes for which an organization can use his donation, the gen-
eral rule that gifts to individuals are nondeductible requires that this specifica-
tion be kept within limits-a taxpayer cannot earmark the gift for a specific
recipient.65
Does this principle, that the donor cannot earmark the gift for a specific
recipient, call into question the earlier conclusion that a donation to the
church to be used to resettle a specific Cambodian refugee family would be
deductible? The resettlement gift is to individuals that, although needy, the
donor has indirectly designated. If the resettlement program is sponsored by
the church, one may argue that mere knowledge of the ultimate beneficiary of
the gift ought not bar the deduction. Absent some personal relationship be-
tween the refugee family and the taxpayer-donor, like an employer-employee
relationship, or evidence that they are personal friends, the intuitive response
is that the gift to the church should be deductible. The author believes that the
intuitive response is the correct result, and that this result can be reached
through a two-step analysis: (1) Is the organizational-donee requirement satis-
fied?, and (2) Is the donor's primary purpose for making the contribution
charitable? Furthermore, the organizational-donee requirement should be con-
sidered satisfied whenever the charitable organization, by actions independent
of the donor, establishes and exercises control over the program in which the
65. E.g., Rev. Rul. 61-66, 1961-1 C.B. 19; see also authorities cited infra note
100 (disallowance where contribution yields personal benefit to donor).
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funds are to be expended, whether or not it has the technical legal right to
determine the ultimate application of the donor's gift.
Applying the suggested analysis to the hypotheticals under discussion, the
results would be:
1) Gift to needy individual selected by the donor (i.e., not designated by inde-
pendent acts of the charity)-nondeductible because organizational-donee test
failed;
2) Gift to church to raise salary of the donor's brother, the pas-
tor-nondeductible because both primary purpose and organizational donee
tests failed (assuming, for purposes of the organizational donee test, that the
church did not independently identify a need for salary supplementation);
3) Gift to church-sponsored refugee who is a personal friend of do-
nor-nondeductible because primary purpose test failed;
4) Gift to church-sponsored refugee where there is no personal relationship
with the donor-deductible.
It might be argued that a primary purpose test is ill-advised, because it
makes deductibility turn on the subjective motivation of the donor. Where the
charity determines that a need exists and solicits assistance, all gifts will ad-
vance public purposes, and perhaps all donors should receive the deduction. In
case 3 above, for example, it might be thought odd that two parishioners who
assist the refugees with identical $100 gifts would receive different tax treat-
ment, where one is a personal friend of the Cambodian family and the other
contributor is not. There is merit to this objection because the suggested func-
tional (or programmatic) interpretation of the organizational donee require-
ment, standing alone, is adequate to assure that the gift will be applied to
public purposes. That is, the charitable organization's oversight should prevent
the transfer from yielding direct benefits to the donor, and if the nondeduct-
ibility of ordinary gifts is founded on a concern over disguised consumption,
the organizational donee test supplies the needed safeguard.
On the other hand, if ordinary gifts are nondeductible because they pro-
vide the donor with intangible consumption, the imprimatur of the charitable
organization is not enough. Where the donation is primarily motivated by per-
sonal friendship, it is more like an ordinary gift than the typical charitable
contribution. More importantly, under the intangible consumption rationale,
gifts to charity are deductible in order to provide a tax incentive, not because
they do not yield intangible consumption. Where the gift is motivated by
friendship or kinship, however, a government subsidy is not needed to induce
the contribution. In this situation, efficient design of the expenditure program
requires that gifts which would be made anyway not receive the tax benefit.
Thus, the primary purpose test is justified under the intangible consumption/
tax subsidy view. The two-step analysis suggested here implements both the
disguised and intangible consumption theories of the charitable contribution
deduction, and would amount to an explicit recognition of the equal dignity of
these theories, putting an end to the tax law's schizophrenic approach.
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Cases and rulings provide some support for the primary purpose test66
and the suggested functional interpretation of the organizational-donee re-
quirement.6 7 It must be emphasized, however, that the suggested two-step
analysis has not received explicit (much less authoritative) judicial approval.6 8
Therefore, where a gift for a specified purpose will in all likelihood benefit
known individuals, the donor would be well advised to make the check payable
to the "Church of X Refugee Resettlement Program," thereby maintaining
the authority of the donee-church to use the funds to support some other refu-
gee family, or to satisfy overhead or other incidental program costs.
Finally, note that section 170(g) permits a taxpayer to deduct up to $50
per month of the amounts expended to maintain an elementary or secondary
student as a member of the taxpayer's household pursuant to an international
student exchange or similar program. This deduction is available only if the
taxpayer cannot claim the $1000 personal exemption deduction of section
151(e) for the student, most probably because the sponsoring organization is
providing more than one-half of the student's support. The special deduction
provision of section 170(g) is required precisely because of the beneficiary des-
ignation problem discussed above.69
5. TP, an audiologist, donates her services one day each month to the
Louisiana School for the Deaf, where she examines the students, administers
hearing tests, and advises the teachers. By volunteering her services, TP
forgoes approximately $400 in fees she earns each day that she sees patients
in her private practice. In addition, TP uses her family car to transport her-
self and the testing apparatus to the school. Can TP deduct the value of her
contributed services? What about the depreciation of TP's automobile and
her fuel costs? Section 170(a)(1), (c)(1).
The performance of uncompensated services is not a "contribution or
gift" deductible under section 170. This fundamental proposition, that a dona-
66. E.g., Rev. Rul. 79-81, 1979-1 C.B. 107; see also White v. United States,
725 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1984) (parents of 19-year-old Mormon missionary allowed
deduction for amounts paid at the request of the Mormon Church to their son to defray
costs of transportation to and living expenses at his mission post, because their primary
purpose was to further aims of the Church rather than to benefit the individual recipi-
ent). Contra Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 932 (1984). The primary purpose test,
of course, derives its principal support by analogy-it is the test used to determine
whether an expenditure which yields both business and personal consumption benefits
is deductible. But see Halperin, Business Deductions for Personal Living Expenses: A
Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 859, 874-76 (1974);
Klein, The Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a Combination Business and
Pleasure Trip-A Conceptual Analysis, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1099, 1104-12 (1966) (dis-
cussion of the practical and theoretical difficulties of the primary purpose test).
67. E.g., Bauer v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 755, 758-59 (W.D. La. 1978),
afjd on other grounds, 594 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1979); Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d
432, 435-36 (7th Cir. 1964); Rev. Rul. 69-473, 1969-2 C.B. 37.
68. The two-step analysis seems to be the approach followed by the IRS. Rev.
Rul. 79-81, 1979-1 C.B. 107, 108; Rev. Rul. 68-484, 1968-2 C.B. 105, 106-07.
69. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (1982) (final sentence).
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tion of services is nondeductible, does not obviously follow from the language
of section 170(c), but may be inferred from the section 170(a) requirement
that "payment" of the contribution be made within the taxable year. The
Code's failure to allow a deduction for an in-kind contribution of services fol-
lows as a necessary cWnsequence of the Code's failure to impose a tax in such
circumstances.70 TP is not taxed on the market value of her donated services,
and therefore does not need an offsetting deduction to assure that her tax base
reflects only personal enrichrnent."' Indeed, the tax law's failure to impute in-
come from the uncompensated performance of services provides one of the
principal justifications for the allowance of a charitable contribution deduc-
tion. The deduction preserves horizontal equity as between TP, who is in a
position to make a tax-free contribution of services, and another taxpayer-a
securities lawyer, for example-who must earn a fee and contribute cash or
property because his services are not of a kind that is needed by charitable
organizations.7
2
70. Occasionally, the distinction between a contribution of services and an indi-
rect contribution of money presents difficult problems. Where the alleged contribution
of services to charity is in substance an anticipatory assignment of income which the
service-performer would otherwise earn, the performer is taxed on the income received
by the charity and may claim a deduction for the contribution under section 170. Char-
acterization of the transaction as an assignment of income can have important (ad-
verse) tax consequences for the service-performer, because the percentage limits on the
charitable contribution deduction (section 170(b)(1)(A) & (B), (b)(2)) may come into
play. Where a famous entertainer agrees with her promoter that the proceeds of a
benefit performance will be paid to charity, anticipatory assignment rules clearly apply.
But even if the entertainer agrees to provide free services directly to the charitable
organization the transaction may be deemed an assignment of income rather than a
gift of services if there is a ready commercial market for the services, because the
charitable organization (as employer of the entertainer) will simply contract with a
promoter to obtain the same result. Rev. Rul. 71, 1953-1 C.B. 18. On the other hand,
where the charitable organization is the actual promoter of the event (Treas. Reg. §
1.61-2(c) (1957); G.C.M. 27026, 1951-2 C.B. 7, declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 84-39,
1984-1 C.B. 279) or where the entertainer does not participate directly or indirectly in
making arrangements for the commercial exploitation of her services (Rev. Rul. 71-33,
1971-1 C.B. 30), the income is "earned" by the charity, and the entertainer has made a
gift of services. See generally 3 B. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GiFrs 75.2.4 (1981); I.R.C. § 114 (1982) (overriding general assignment-of-
income principles where corporate sports promoters conduct benefits for the American
National Red Cross).
71. This argument assumes that gifts should not be treated as a consumption
expense of the donor-that the intangible satisfactions associated with giving are ithsuf-
ficient to justify imposition of a tax on the donor. While justifiable in theory, this ap-
proach is not the best view of current law. See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying
text.
72. If gifts are treated as a consumption expense of the donor (the better view
of current law), then the horizontal equity criterion should be satisfied by taxing TP on
the value of her services rather than allowing the donor of property a deduction. This
approach would reflect intangible consumption by including both gifts of property and
services in the tax base. On this view, criteria other than horizontal equity must justify
the deduction. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
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Does the nondeductibility of TP's services extend to the incidental costs
(depreciation and gasoline) incurred in connection with the performance of the
services? The IRS takes the position that the depreciation on TP's automobile
is not deductible because it is not an out-of-pocket expense of the sort "pay-
ment of which" can be made within the meaning of section 170(a).7 3 TP's gas
costs, however, are deductible.7
4
C. Percentage Limitations and Carryover
6.A. This year TP, an elderly alumnus of the University of Missouri
Medical School, decides to establish a $200,000 fund, the income from which
will be used to bring prominent figures in the medical and biological sciences
to the Columbia campus to present lectures and seminars. TP's adjusted gross
income for the current year will be $500,000. Should TP contribute the
$200,000 to the Board of Curators as trustee of the endowment fund, or
should he name his own bank as trustee? Read section 170(b)(1)(A), paying
particular attention to the introductory and final clauses, then examine sec-
tion 170(b)(1)(B) & (F), section 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(viii), and section 509(a).
As a policy matter, why the difference in result?
First consider the result if TP names the Board of Curators as trustee. In
this case, the contribution is made directly to the University of Missouri, an
educational organization described in clause (ii) of section 170(b)(1)(A). Ac-
cordingly, the contribution will be deductible up to fifty percent of TP's contri-
bution base for the taxable year. Section 170(b)(1)(F) provides that the term
"contribution base" means, in general, adjusted gross income. Therefore, TP's
full $200,000 contribution in trust to the Board of Curators would be
deductible.
On the other hand, if TP named his own bank as trustee, the contribution
is not made to the University of Missouri, it is made to the bank. Note the
difference between the section 170(c) definition of charitable contribution,
which includes a gift "to or for the use of" a qualified organization, and the
section 170(b)(1)(A) requirement that the contribution, in order to qualify for
the fifty-percent adjusted gross income limit, must be made "to" one of the
organizations listed in section 170(b)(1)(A). Gifts in trust are for the use of
the beneficiary, but they are to the trust.7 5 The effect of this subtle shift in
73. E.g., Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1965).
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (1972). See generally Newman, The Inequitable
Tax Treatment of Expenses Incident to Charitable Service, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 139
(1978). In lieu of deducting actual gas costs, taxpayers may claim a deduction based
on the standard mileage rate of 12 cents a mile. I.R.C. § 170(j) (West Supp. 1985).
75. Rockefeller v. Commissioner, 676 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1982), acq., Rev. Rul.
84-61, 1984-17 I.R.B. 8; Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-8(a)(2) (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A53 (1954). By its acquiesence in Rockefeller, the Service has
conceded that expenditures made for the benefit of a charitable organization are con-
structive or in-kind contributions "to" the organization, even though the charity never
receives cash. Accordingly, deductible expenditures made incident to the performance
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language is to say that gifts in trust are subject to the fifty-percent adjusted
gross income limit only if the trust is itself an organization specified in section
170(b)(1)(A)7
Clearly, the trust is not itself an educational organization, and the ques-
tion then becomes whether it falls within any of the other clauses of subsection
(b)(1)(A). The trust is not a church, not a hospital or medical research organ-
ization, and not a governmental unit. Clauses (iv) and (vi) also do not apply
because TP is the sole contributor-the trust does not receive a substantial
part of its support from either governmental units or the general public.7 7 Be-
cause the bank will invest the settlor's contribution and turn over the trust
income to the University rather than selecting and paying guest lecturers it-
self, clause (vii) also will not apply.78 This leaves clause (viii) as the only basis
for arguing that the trust is itself an organization described in section
170(b)(1)(A).
To qualify for the fifty-percent limit under clause (viii) the organization
must be described in section 509(a)(2) or (3). The trust is not an organization
described in section 509(a)(2) because it will not normally receive more than
one-third of its support in contributions from persons other than disqualified
persons. TP, as a substantial contributor to the trust, is a disqualified person
under section 4946, and his contribution will provide substantially all of the
trust's support in the year of its organization. In subsequent years the trust's
entire support will consist of its investment income, so the requirements of
both subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 509(a)(2) will not be satisfied.
Section 509(a)(3) does not contain the requirement that the organization
receive broad public support. Therefore, it provides a more hopeful basis for
arguing that the trust is eligible for the fifty-percent limit. The trust is organ-
ized and operated exclusively for the benefit of the University of Missouri,79
of services for an organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A) qualify for the 50%
limit. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
76. All corporate gifts are subject to a limit of 10% of taxable income, regard-
less of the purposes of the donee or whether the transfer is in trust. I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)
(1982). The 10% limit cannot be circumvented by claiming the contribution as a busi-
ness expense for advertising or community goodwill. Id. § 162(b).
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(6)(i) (1972) (contribution by an individual taken
into account as support from the "general public" for purposes of section
170(b)(1)(A)(vi) only to the extent of 2% of the organization's total support for the
relevant period); id. § 1.170A-9(e)(7)(i) ("support" under section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) de-
fined as in section 509(d)). The support test applicable to section 170(b)(1)(A)(iv) is
not defined as specifically by regulations, id. § 1.170A-9(b)(2)(ii), yet the relevant stat-
utory language is identical under clauses (iv) and (vi).
78. That is, the trust is not a private operating foundation (section
170(b)(1)(E)(i)) because it will not itself use the trust income to advance its charitable
purposes. Instead, it makes grants to the University to conduct such activities. I.R.C. §
4942(j)(3)(A) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-l(b)(1) (1972). The trust is also not a
conduit foundation (section 170(b)(1)(E)(ii)) because the settlor's entire $200,000
contribution will not be promptly transferred to the University.
79. The regulations set forth detailed requirements concerning: (1) provisions of
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an organization described in section 509(a)(1) (which refers back to the sec-
tion 170(b)(1)(A) list that includes educational organizations). The third re-
quirement of section 509(a)(3) is also satisfied, because the trust is not con-
trolled by TP, a disqualified person."s Yet the second requirement, that the
trust be "operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with" the or-
ganization it supports, presents serious difficulties. If TP names his bank as
trustee, the trust clearly will not be operated, supervised, or controlled by the
University of Missouri. 81 The only plausible argument is that the trust might
operate in connection with the University.82
The regulations under section 509(a)(3) provide that a supporting organi-
zation (here the trust) is considered to be "operated in connection with" the
eligible charity it supports (here the University) only if their relationship is
sufficient to insure that (1) the trust will be responsive to the needs or de-
mands of the University, and (2) the trust will constitute an integral part of,
or maintain a significant involvement in, the operations of the University. 3 A
charitable trust meets the responsiveness test if it is enforceable by organiza-
tions which it supports that are named in the trust instrument." The majority
rule is that charitable trusts are enforceable by persons with a special interest
in the trust (such as a named beneficiary organization), so TP's trust is re-
sponsive. 5 However, the integral part test demands that the supported organi-
zation be dependent on the type of support provided. Where, as here, the sup-
port provided is the payment of substantially all of the trust's income, the
income must represent a sufficient part of the Medical School's total support
to assure financial dependency and hence attentiveness to the operations of the
the organization's governing instrument (articles of incorporation or deed of trust) nec-
essary to establish that it is "organized . . . exclusively for the benefit of, to perform
the functions of, or to carry out the purposes of one or more" eligible charities; (2)
what constitutes adequate "specification" of the eligible charities to be supported; and(3) what expenditures satisfy the operational test. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(a) to -4(e)(1972). Where the trust instrument obligates the bank to distribute all trust income
annually to the University of Missouri, these requirements would be satisfied.
80. Note, however, that if TP were a joint trustee with the bank, the trust
would be considered controlled by a disqualified person, and if TP owned a majority of
the voting stock or was a principal officer of the bank indirect control would be found.
Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(j) (1972).
81. The terms "operated, supervised or controlled by" demand that the eligible
charity (here the University) possess a substantial degree of direction or control over
the conduct of the trust, comparable to the relationship between a parent and subsidi-
ary. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(f)(4), -4(g).
82. The trust is not "supervised or controlled in connection with" the University
because control or management of the organizations is not vested in the same persons.
Id. § 1.509(a)-4(f)(4), -4(h).
83. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(f)(3), -4(i).
84. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(2)(i), (iii).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391; id. comment c (1959). TP's
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trust."6 The precise proportion of total support that must be provided to assure
attentiveness depends on all the facts and circumstances,8 7 but the annual in-
come from the trust's $200,000 corpus seems unlikely to assure attentiveness
when compared to the Medical School's total budget.
The preceding ahalysis indicates that if TP names his local bank as trus-
tee, the trust will not qualify under section 509(a)(3), and hence TP's gift will
not qualify for the fifty-percent limit on charitable contribution deductions.
But what is the purpose of these technical requirements? And in particular,
why must a supporting organization be "operated, supervised or controlled by
or in connection with" the eligible charities it supports? The "responsiveness"
and "integral part" tests of the regulations provide a clue-Congress wanted
to assure that the organization supported had both the legal authority (re-
sponsiveness test) and the practical incentive (integral part test) to oversee the
operations of the supporting organization and if necessary enforce its charita-
ble obligations. The organizations described in section 170(b)(1)(A) are tax-
favored charities (higher deduction limits), and Congress has conditioned that
special status on a showing that either: (1) the organization actually conducts
a preferred activity (religion, education, medical care or research, government
services),88 (2) the organization receive broad public support, 9 or (3) the or-
ganization supports a preferred activity or an organization receiving broad
public support and circumstances indicate that the supporting organization is
likely to be managed to provide the maximum benefit to the organizations
supported. 0 Returning to our hypothetical, if TP names his bank as trustee,
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(iii) (1972). Note that it is the proportion of
the Medical School's total support, not the absolute amount of income provided by the
trust, that determines attentiveness to the operations of the trust, and hence whether
the integral part test is met. (An exception is provided in circumstances where the
supporting organization's income funds a particular important function or activity; de-
spite the small proportion of funds provided, in these circumstances continuance of an
important function is likely to assure oversight.) Id. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(iii)(a) (penulti-
mate sentence); id. at 4(i)(3)(iii)(b). The regulations expressly provide that the sup-
porting organization's income should be compared to the total support of a department
or school, rather than to the total support of the University, where a particular depart-
ment or school is the beneficiary of the support. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(iii)(a) (final
sentence).
87. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(iii)(d).
88. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i) to (v) (1982).
89. Id. §§ 170(b)(1)(A)(iv), (vi); id. 509(a)(2).
90. Id. § 509(a)(3). The private operating foundations described in I.R.C. §
170(b)(1)(E)(i) (West Supp. 1985) do not fit neatly into this tripartite classification.
These foundations need not advance a preferred activity and do not receive broad pub-
lic support, but they are subject to detailed requirements to assure that they actually
conduct activities in pursuance of their charitable purposes (i.e., an operating founda-
tion must operate, not merely provide financial support). This activity requirement and
the IRS supervision it entails is apparently deemed adequate assurance that the organi-
zation will advance truly public purposes. In this view, operating foundations are analo-
gized to organizations that receive broad public support, except that the activity re-
quirement, rather than dependence on contributions from the general public, is
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the Medical School (despite its legal authority as a beneficiary named under
the trust instrument) may not have the financial incentive to scrutinize the
bank's performance as trustee, to assure an adequate investment yield for the
University, or prevent conflicts of interests or self-dealing.
6.B. If TP names the bank as trustee, how much of the $200,000 en-
dowment fund can he deduct? What if he also contributes $180,000 this year
to the University of Missouri-Columbia Hospital?
If the bank is named as trustee, the gift in trust will still qualify as a
charitable contribution under section 170(c), but a different percentage limita-
tion will apply. Section 170(b)(1)(B) provides that any charitable contribution
that is not made to one of the favored donees listed in section 170(b)(1)(A) is
deductible, but only up to a limit of thirty percent of the donor's contribution
base. TP's contribution base for the current year is his adjusted gross income
(AGI), $500,000. Thus, if TP names his bank as trustee, he may deduct only
$150,000 of the corpus. If TP also makes a $180,000 contribution to the Uni-
versity hospital this year, an even smaller portion of the trust corpus can be
deducted, because section 170(b)(1)(B) provides that the thirty-percent limit
cannot operate to increase the total deductible contributions for the year above
fifty percent of the donor's contribution base. Because the $180,000 charitable
contribution to the hospital is described in section 170(b)(1)(A), only $70,000
of the trust corpus would be deductible, as this amount brings TP's total chari-
table contribution deduction to $250,000, one-half of his adjusted gross
income.
6.C. Again assuming that TP makes the $180,000 gift to the University
hospital during the current year, what becomes of the excess contribution?
Section 170(b)(1)(B), final sentence, and 170(d)(1).
If the Board of Curators is named trustee, all of TP's charitable contribu-
tions are made to organizations subject to the fifty-percent limit, and the
$130,000 excess contribution ($380,000 total contributions minus $250,000
AGI limit) will be available as a carryforward to each of the next five taxable
years until it is absorbed within the fifty-percent limit for those years. If TP
names his bank as trustee, the five-year carryforward would also be available,
but the excess contribution remains subject to the thirty-percent limit in the
years to which it is carried.9 ' Thus, if TP makes no charitable contributions in
considered sufficient to assure maximum societal benefits from the charity. Conduit
foundations, on the other hand, fit into the third category described in the text. Id. §§
170(b)(1)(E)(ii); id. § 4942(g)(1). The House Ways and Means Committee stated the
principle as follows:
Because as a general rule public charities and operating foundations di-
rectly carry out charitable functions, expend charitable donations more
promptly, and have public involvement, support and supervision, the commit-
tee believes that a tax preference for contributions to public charities and
operating foundations continues to be appropriate.
H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1464 (1984).
91. Prior to 1984, no carryover was permitted for excess contributions subject to
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the succeeding year and his adjusted gross income is $400,000, only $120,000
(thirty percent of $400,000) of the $130,000 carryforward will be deductible.
6.D. What is the purpose of the fifty-percent limit?
Prior to 1970, certain wealthy taxpayers who lived on their savings and
devoted all income to charity could deduct the full amount of their contribu-
tions, thereby paying no tax on large incomes.9 2 Present law reflects a judg-
ment by Congress that although charitable contributions are important and
should be encouraged, every taxpayer should bear part of the burden of sup-
porting the government. 93 Yet many of the activities that charitable contribu-
the lower adjusted gross income limit (then 20%). Thus if TP established the trust in
1983 and named his bank as trustee, $130,000 of the corpus would never be deductible.
Thus, prior to 1984 contributions made to a donee not described in section
170(b)(1)(A) were disfavored in three respects: (i) they were subject to a 20% limit;
(ii) excess contributions were not available as a carryforward and therefore could never
be deducted; and (iii) the rules of section 170(d)(1) provided that a carryforward of
excess contributions from a prior tax year would count towards the 50% limit in a
subsequent year before any 170(b)(1)(B)-type contributions made in the subsequent
year were taken into account (thus, in effect, bumping disfavored contributions by prior
excess favored contributions). Congress explained its decision to permit a carryforward
of excess contributions subject to the 30% limit as follows:
The committee believes that the failure of present law to provide a carry-
over deduction in the case of excess contributions to private nonoperating
foundations merely requires the donor to divide a planned large gift to a non-
operating foundation into smaller amounts contributed over several years. Ac-
cordingly, the committee believes that extension of the carryover rules to con-
tributions to nonoperating foundations is not inconsistent with longstanding
Federal tax policy that provides a tax advantage to contributions to public
charities and operating foundations.
H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1463-64 (1984). In short, the failure to pro-
vide a carryforward for 170(b)(1)(B)-type contributions was a trap for the unwary
(and the ill-advised).
92. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C) (amended by Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a)(1), 83
Stat. 487, 549, 557-58 (1969), which gradually lowered the unlimited deduction to 50%
over the period 1970-74).
93. For example, in a 1968 study of tax reform proposals the Treasury Depart-
ment observed:
The general purpose of [the charitable contribution deduction percentage]
limitation is to prevent people from discharging their entire tax liability to the
Government by making donations to selected charities equal to the amount of
their otherwise taxable income. In this manner, persons are encouraged to
support charitable organizations but at the same time also contribute to the
costs of running their Government . ...
In keeping with the basic principles underlying the structural revision of
the charitable contribution deduction-that all individuals should pay their
fair share of taxes in order to support the Federal Government-this provision
of the reform program would repeal the unlimited charitable deduction.
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND
PROPOSALS, U.S. TREASURY DEPT. 204 (Comm. Print 1969). Perhaps a more important
factor behind the repeal of the unlimited deduction than this theoretical concern was a
popular perception of abuse resulting from a number of widely publicized cases of tax-
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tions support, such as poverty relief, education, and medical care, would re-
quire government support if not funded through charity.9 4 Therefore, it can be
argued that the taxpayer who gives all of his income to charity is reducing the
burdens of government, not avoiding his fair share of taxes or shirking his
obligation to support our society. Perhaps the appropriate response to this ar-
gument is that even under a regime with no charitable contribution deduction,
the government would not take over all the functions (e.g., religion or family
planning) that exempt organizations now provide," and the government would
certainly set a different list of priorities than most private donors.96
But if we resist direct government support because we believe in the value
of pluralism, how can we have too much of a good thing? Why not replace the
charitable contribution deduction with a dollar-for-dollar credit against tax?
This approach would recognize that in the absence of voluntary private sup-
port many activities of charitable organizations (such as poverty relief and the
provision of cultural and educational opportunities) would become the function
of government, and would therefore treat public and private provision of these
social services consistently. Thus, taxpayers would be permitted to satisfy their
federal tax liability by selecting among charities and the federal government.
This approach would not make the tax system voluntary, taxpayers would still
have to devote that portion of their annual income that is determined under
payers with incomes in excess of $1 million paying no federal income tax due to the
unlimited deduction. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1969). Yet it
appears to have been the Treasury itself that instigated the public outcry by releasing
the data. HousE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, supra at 85-95.
Similar limits have been applied to certain other tax incentive provisions, but there
is no comprehensive or consistent approach. For example, the investment tax credit is
limited to a percentage of tax liability (currently 85% in excess of 25,000 (I.R.C. §
38(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985)) and benefits and contributions under qualified retirement
plans are limited to a percentage of the participant's compensation (I.R.C. § 415(b)(1),
(c)(1) (1982)). See S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1962); H.R. REP. No.
807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1974). In contrast, there is no limit on the amount of
exempt income that can be earned in the form of interest in municipal bonds, and the
accelerated cost recovery deduction is allowed to eliminate taxable income.
94. Since World War II, government funding has come to play an increasingly
important role in several areas of traditional philanthropic endeavor, particularly in the
provision of health care and poverty relief. See supra notes 36, 38.
95. R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 162 (rev. ed. 1976).
96. The 1984 Treasury Department tax reform proposals would eliminate the
50% limit for contributions either to or for the use of the favored donees listed in
section 170(b)(1)(A). (Note that under present law gifts "for the use of" such charities
are subject to the lower 30% limit.) The lower limit (currently 30%) on gifts to or for
the use of other charities would be retained, however. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH--GENERAL EXPLA-
NATION OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS 75-77 (1984), reprinted in 1984
FED. TAXES (P-H) Bull. 12 Extra, § 2 (Dec. 20, 1984) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY
REPORT ON TAX REFORM]. The proposed retention of percentage limits on contribu-
tions toward organizations not on the "favored" list of section 170(b)(1)(A) apparently
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the progressive rate schedules to public purposes and file a return. But to sat-
isfy their debt to society each taxpayer could select between the government's
slate of priorities, the United Way's slate, and his or her own personal
combination.
The credit approach would force the government to compete for social
service dollars. Such competition may be thought inefficient or unseemly (con-
sider the advertising campaigns likely to result). But there is a more funda-
mental reason for rejecting the dollar-for-dollar credit. Many government ser-
vices are not competitive and could not be provided by the private voluntary
sector-for example, national defense or economic stabilization. As to these
functions there is a legitimate concern that consumers cannot be trusted to
evaluate properly the relative merits of, for example, a stronger defense versus
better museums or public parks.97 This consideration may supply a convincing
reason for rejecting charitable contributions as direct offsets to tax where the
taxes fund uniquely governmental functions. But in many fields government
and private philanthropy are complementary, and here perhaps consumers
should be permitted to vote with their dollars. The fifty-percent deduction
limit can perhaps be viewed as a mechanism to effectuate an appropriately
limited consumer sovereignty over social service expenditures. 98
D. Amount Deductible
7. TP and her husband attended the annual Museum of Natural His-
tory benefit dinner. TP paid $50 apiece for the tickets. The gala affair was
held in and catered by the museum cafeteria. How much can TP deduct?
Section 170(c).
Given the quality of the food, TP can probably deduct substantially all of
the $100 she paid for the tickets. Section 170(c) teaches that charitable con-
tribution means gift. All but the value of the meals provided is a gift-this is
just a scrambled transaction, and only the gift part is deductible. But what
constitutes a gift? Recall the Duberstein standards: whether the payment pro-
ceeds from "the constraining force of any moral or legal duty" or from "de-
tached and disinterested generosity." 99 How would these standards be applied
to the Metropolis Museum of Art in Gotham City, which doesn't'charge ad-
mission to the galleries, but makes it very clear what the "recommended dona-
97. If consumers are permitted to make such categorical budget decisions the
likely result would be overfunding of those public services that yield the most direct
and immediate consumption benefits for the contributor, while services that produce
highly diffuse or deferred benefits would be underfunded. See Wiedenbeck, supra note
42.
98. Accordingly, the best justification for the deduction limit is not that govern-
ment could not take over all the activities of private philanthropy (see supra text ac-
companying note 95), but that private philanthropy could not take over all the func-
tions of government.
99. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
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tion" is as visitors file past the cash register? Is payment of the recommended
donation deductible? Where the recipient is a charitable organization rather
than a business associate as in Duberstein, should the IRS be less inclined to
assert a disqualifying "moral obligation"? 100
8.A. TP owns certain property worth $10,000 that has a $5000 adjusted
basis. What is the general rule concerning the amount of the charitable con-
tribution deduction where the gift is of property rather than cash? Compare
section 170(a)(l) with section 170(e)(1).
Section 170(e)(1) is a special rule that reduces the amount of the deduc-
tion, in certain circumstances, by the unrealized appreciation in the value of
the property. This special rule indicates that the general rule governing the
amount of the charitable contribution deduction is that the taxpayer may de-
duct the fair market value of the property.101 Compare this general rule for
charitable deductions with section 102(a), which consistently provides that, at
the time of a gift, the donee may exclude the full fair market value of the
property.
8.B. Assume TP is in the seventy-percent tax bracket (applicable to
taxable years beginning before 1981) and that the gain on the sale of his
property would generate ordinary income. If he sold the property and kept the
proceeds, how much cash would he have after taxes? If instead he gave the
property to charity, how much cash would he have in pocket, taking into ac-
count the deduction? What is the purpose of section 170(e)(1)(A)?
TP's gain on the sale of the property is $5000 ($10,000 fair market value
minus $5000 adjusted basis). Therefore, upon sale TP would be left with
$6500 in pocket after taxes ($5000 return of basis plus $1500 after-tax pro-
ceeds at the seventy-percent rate). Before section 170(e) was enacted, if TP
donated the property to charity he would have a $10,000 charitable contribu-
tion deduction which would shelter unrelated income from tax. Absent this
deduction, TP would be left with only $3000 of the unrelated income after
taxes. Accordingly, upon making a charitable contribution of the property, TP
would be left with $7000 in after-tax proceeds attributable to the transfer.
Under the fair market value rule, he is $500 better off by making a charitable
contribution of the property than he is by selling it for cash! Section
170(e)(1)(A) is designed to prevent this result whenever income from the sale
of the property would be ordinary income or short-term capital gain. In a
transaction such as this, where the taxpayer actually profits by his gift to char-
ity, the IRS could argue that the deduction is not allowable because the "gift"
100. See Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); Annot., 33
A.L.R. FED. 373 (1977); 2 B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GiFrs 35.1.3 (1981); Colliton, The Meaning of "Contribution or Gift"for Charitable
Contribution Deduction Purposes, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 973 (1980); Note, Measuring Off-
sets and Eliminating Inequities in the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 893 (1981).
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-I(c) (1972).
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does not proceed from detached and disinterested generosity. Merely by lower-
ing the highest marginal tax rate to fifty percent in 1981, Congress assured
that taxpayers could not profit from the donation of appreciated property to
charity. But section 170(e)(1)(A), which was enacted while the top marginal
tax rates were higher than fifty percent, goes farther-it limits the amount of
the deduction upon a contribution of inventory or short-term gain property to
the adjusted basis of the property.02 Thus, under section 170(e)(1)(A) a gift
of unrealized income is treated like a gift of services-no deduction is allowed
because the contribution was never subject to tax.
Congress was apparently surprised by the effectiveness of section
170(e)(1)(A) in discouraging tax-motivated contributions. 10 3 Note the excep-
tions for certain favored contributions set forth in section 170(e)(3) and (4).
Under these provisions, a taxpayer may still deduct up to one-half of the ordi-
nary income and short-term gain components of unrealized appreciation in
cases where the contribution is to be used for care of the ill, needy, or infants
(such as food or medical supplies), or consists of certain new scientific equip-
ment to be used in research at qualified educational institutions. Can Apple
Computer, Inc. deduct the full list price of its products if it pursues a program
of donating a new computer to every elementary school and high school in
America?104
8.C. If TP's $5000 gain on the sale of the property qualifies as long-
term capital gain, only forty percent of the gain would be included in his
taxable income under section 1202(a). Now do you understand the point of
section 170(e)(1)(B)? How much can TP deduct if the property is a building
site which he donates to the University? Stocks and bonds? A Picasso sketch?
What justifies these limitations on section 170(e)(1)(B)?
If the income upon the sale of the property would be classified as long-
term capital gain, section 170(e)(1)(B) requires that the taxpayer reduce the
amount of his charitable contribution deduction by forty percent of the gain.
The sixty percent of the gain that would not be taxed upon a sale of the prop-
102. Section 170(e) was enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, but the fallacy
of a deduction for unrealized appreciation was recognized much earlier. The House
version of the Revenue Act of 1938 contained a provision that would have limited the
amount deductible on an in-kind contribution to the lesser of adjusted basis or fair
market value of the property. But the conference committee struck this limitation. H.R.
REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 20 (1938).
103. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1976); S. REP. No. 144, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 87-88 (1981).
104. Answer: No. It is not a qualified research contribution because the recipient
schools are not institutions of higher education and the computers will not be used in
research or research training. The "Computer Equipment Contribution Act of 1982,"
H.R. 5573, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), would have added a new exception to section
170(e)(1)(A) to encourage such contributions. The bill passed the House, but was not
enacted. See H.R. REP. No. 836, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. REP. No. 647, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Apcar & Chase, Apple Wants a Big Tax Break So It Can Give
One of its Computers to Every Public School, Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1982, at 29, col. 4.
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erty is still available as a charitable contribution deduction. 05 Accordingly,
the general rule reflected in section 170(e)(1) is that the amount of the chari-
table contribution deduction is reduced from fair market value by the amount
of the unrealized appreciation (whether ordinary income, short-term capital
gain, or long-term capital gain) that would be subject to tax upon a sale of the
property.
At first glance the rule of section 170(e)(1)(B), which grants the donor a
partial deduction for income on which he has never paid tax, seems inconsis-
tent with the theory of the charitable contribution deduction. It must be
remembered, though, that the donor never would pay tax on sixty percent of
the long-term gain. If section 170(e) did not contain an allowance correspond-
ing to the tax concession granted long-term capital gains, the donor would
simply sell appreciated capital assets (or section 1231 property'06 ) and contrib-
ute the after-tax proceeds to charity. 10 7 The forty-percent reduction of section
170(e)(1)(B) makes the tax consequences of an in-kind contribution
equivalent to the tax consequences of a market sale of the property followed
by a cash contribution of the property's fair market value."0 8
Because the University is not a private foundation 0 9 the donation of a
105. The reduction in the case of a corporation (28/46) is the ratio of the corpo-
rate capital gains tax rate (28% under section 1201) to the generally-applicable tax
rate on corporate taxable income (46% under section 11). The 40% reduction in the
case of an individual is also the ratio of the rate of tax on net capital gain to the tax
rate on ordinary income, by virtue of the 60% deduction of section 1202(a).
106. The 40% reduction also applies to depreciable business property and real
property used in a trade or business held for more than six months (so-called "section
1231 property"), even though such property does not technically qualify as capital as-
sets under section 1221(2). I.R.C. § 170(e)(1) (1982) (final sentence).
107. Query whether the donor, in these circumstances, would be met with a step
transaction argument by the IRS.
108.
Let: X = adjusted basis of property in hands of the donor,
Y = unrealized long-term gain, and
tm = marginal tax rate of donor.
Then, on an in-kind contribution,
Deduction = X + 0.60Y, via section 170(e)(1)(B).
Whereas if the donor sells and contributes the after-tax proceeds,
Deduction = X + (1 - 0.40tm)Y, and 0 < tm < 0.50, via section 1.
In both cases, the donor has disposed of the entire value of the property (either to the
charity alone, or to the charity and the IRS), but the deductions differ. This demon-
strates that an in-kind contribution does not yield the same tax consequences as a sale
of the property followed by contribution of only the after-tax proceeds; from the do-
nor's tax perspective the gift in kind is less advantageous. Yet, if the donor sells the
property and contributes the after-tax proceeds plus an amount of cash equal to the
capital gains tax paid (i.e., contributes the fair market value of the property), then the
donor's deduction is X + Y, which is greater than the deduction for the in-kind contri-
bution by the amount 0.40Y. Although the deduction is greater, the donor has paid out
an extra amount of cash, equal to the capital gains tax (0.40tmY). The extra deduction
will produce a tax saving exactly equal to the extra cash paid out.
109. I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1982). A full fair market value de-
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building site that had been held by the donor for more than six months" °
would entitle the donor to a $10,000 deduction, the full fair market value. The
contribution is not reduced under section 170(e) because the unrealized appre-
ciation would generate long-term capital gain if the property were sold, and
the building site is real property. The same result applies to a donation of
seburities that have been owned for the long-term holding period; although the
stocks and bonds are personal property, they are intangible personal property,
and section 170(e)(1)(B) does not apply. The Picasso sketch presents the
hardest case. Clearly, the sketch is tangible personal property, so the availabil-
ity of a full fair market value deduction turns upon whether the use of the
sketch by the University will be unrelated to the purpose or function which
constitutes the basis for the University's tax exemption-that is, its educa-
tional mission. If the sketch is used for display in the University's museum or
in art history classes, this educationally-related use would entitle the donor to
a full fair market value deduction. On the other hand, if the University sells
the sketch and uses the cash to support its educational program, the use is
unrelated."'
The preceding examples illustrate that taxpayers can still deduct the full
fair market value of property in several important situations. All long-term
appreciation is deductible where a public charity receives realty, intangible
property, or related-use tangible personal property. These are glaring excep-
tions to the forty-percent reduction rule; because most wealthy taxpayers own
appreciated stock or real estate, the practical effect of the statute is to exempt
wealthy contributors from the impact of section 170(e). Why this undeserved
extra deduction for the rich? The exceptions to the forty-percent reduction
rule appear to be the result of political compromise, plain and simple." 2 This
tax "loophole" proved unassailable, not because of a capitulation to the
wealthy, but because of congressional concern about the effect of the forty-
percent reduction on the volume of contributions to certain organizations. Al-
most all substantial gifts of property are made by upper-income taxpayers,'
duction is now allowed for gifts of readily marketable stock to a private foundation
(even if it is not an operating or conduit foundation), because such gifts do not involve
the opportunity for abuse through overvaluation of the contributed property that is
present in other situations where the donor has practical control over the foundation.
I.R.C. § 170(e)(5) (West. Supp. 1985); H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1464
(1984).
110. The long-term holding period under section 1222 has been reduced to six
months for property acquired after June 22, 1984 and before January 1, 1988. Tax
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1001(a)(1) to (2), 98 Stat. 1011.
111. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b)(3)(i) (1972).
112. See e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 40872 (1969) (colloquy between Rep. Reid and
Rep. Mills); 115 CONG. REC. 22576-77 (1969) (statement of Rep. Broyhill).
113. Morgan, Dye & Hybels, supra note 31, at 186-88 (largest charitable gift
during the year included corporate stock for 31% of households with income of
$500,000 or more; no stock gifts reported by households with income below $50,000);
FILER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 144-45 (50% of property gifts made by
persons with $100,000 or more income, and at upper income levels those who give
1985]
37
Wiedenbeck: Wiedenbeck: Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
who are the principal contributors to higher education, hospitals, and cultural
organizations.11  Thus the forty-percent reduction rule would have a dispropor-
tionate adverse impact on the funding of these organizations." 5 Concern for
this adverse impact on some donees outweighed the desire for equitable tax
treatment of all donors."' Yet since appreciated realty and securities would be
tax free if held until death, some have argued that the inequity lies in section
1014, and that the fair market value deduction is necessary to avoid an unde-
sirable deferral of charitable contributions.1 ' The 1984 Treasury Department
tax reform plan proposes to limit the charitable deduction to the inflation-
adjusted basis of contributed property, thereby disallowing all deductions for
untaxed appreciation." 8
Although the fair market value rule still holds sway over the important
area of gifts of appreciated stock and realty to public charities, gifts of such
property are subject to special (more restrictive) percentage limitations. Tax-
payers are given an election with respect to charitable contributions of appre-
ciated realty, intangible property, and related-use personalty that would other-
wise be subject to the fifty-percent limit on deductibility."' The donor may
elect to reduce his deduction by forty percent of the appreciation on all such
property contributed during the year (including carryovers to the taxable
year), in which event the fifty-percent limit applies. 120 Absent the election, all
appreciation is deductible but the total value of all gifts that escape the reduc-
tion rule is limited to thirty percent of adjusted gross income.' 2' If property
bearing long-term appreciation is contributed to a private foundation other
'than an operating or conduit foundation (i.e., to a donee normally subject to
the thirty-percent limit), the aggregate of all such contributions is subject to a
appreciated property give more generously than those who contribute only cash).
114. See supra text accompanying note 56.
115. Feldstein & Taylor, supra note 41, at 1435-36 (3% overall drop in contribu-
tions if deductibility of appreciation were eliminated would translate into 8% drop for
educational organizations); Feldstein & Clotfelter, supra note 41, at 1411-12 (con-
structive realization of appreciated property gifts predicted to cause 64% reduction in
gifts by household with income of $100,000 or more, no decrease in giving at lower
income levels).
116. This special treatment of gifts of appreciated realty and securities might be
viewed as proof that the choice of a charitable contribution deduction (in lieu of
matching grants or tax credits) involves a judgment that the charitable goals of the
rich are "better" or more socially useful than programs supported by the poor. See
supra text accompanying note 55.
117. FILER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 145-46. Given the different
incentive effect of the estate tax charitable contribution deduction (I.R.C. § 2055), it
seems reasonable to expect that charitable giving by high-income taxpayers would not
only be deferred until death, but reduced as well. FILER COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 15, at 146.
118. TREASURY REPORT ON TAX REFORM, supra note 96, at 72-74.
119. These are contributions to (not in trust for) a donee described in section
170(b)(l)(A)-public charities and private operating or conduit foundations.
120. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C)(iii) (1982).
121. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C)(i) (West Supp. 1985).
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twenty-percent limit, even though the amount of each such contribution other
than readily marketable stock is reduced by forty percent of the appreciation
under section 170(e)(1)(B). a22 The usual five-year carryforward is available
for contributions that exceed either of these appreciated property percentage
limits. 12 3
The overvaluation of in-kind contributions is a continuing enforcement
problem for the IRS and a major source of friction between taxpayers and the
Service. The Commissioner now has an art advisory panel to assist in dealing
with difficult valuation problems. In addition, a new overvaluation penalty now
applies. Section 6659 provides for a penalty of thirty percent of the amount of
any underpayment that results from a greater-than-fifty-percent overvaluation
of charitable deduction property. This penalty applies, however, only if the
underpayment of tax resulting from the overvaluation is greater than $1000.
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 strengthened compliance in this area by
mandating the issuance of regulations under section 170(a)(1) that condition
the allowance of a deduction for a contribution of property (other than pub-
licly-traded securities) claimed to have a value of more than $5000 on ob-
taining a qualified appraisal of the property by an independent appraiser and
the filing of a summary of the appraisal with the return on which the deduc-
tion is claimed.124 If the donee disposes of the property within two years of its
receipt, it will be required to file an information return (with a copy sent to
the donor) indicating the amount realized on such disposition to facilitate au-
dit adjustment in case of overvaluation.1 25
8.D. Again assuming that TP's property is worth $10,000 and has a
$5000 adjusted basis, suppose the property is stock and TP makes a bargain
sale to a public charity for $5000. TP asserts the $5000 is received tax-free
because he had no gain under section 1001, and TP also claims a $5000 de-
duction for the appreciation because this was the gift component of the
scrambled transaction. What result? Section 1011(b).
This problem illustrates the bargain sale to charity, a device that was
formerly used to give the taxpayer the best of all possible worlds-the invest-
ment in the property was received tax-free, the appreciation in value was not
taxed, and the taxpayer claimed a deduction for this appreciation component.
122. Id. § 170(b)(1)(D); H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1464 (1984)
(20% limit applies to gifts of capital gain property to private nonoperating foundations
"including gifts of certain appreciated stock which are deductible under the bill at fair
market value"). This statement assumes that the term "capital gain property," al-
though undefined in section 170(b)(1)(D), was intended to have the same meaning as
under section 170(b)(1)(C)(iv).
123. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C)(ii) (1982); I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(D)(ii) (West Supp.
1985).
124. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 155(a), 98 Stat. 494, 691. The regulation implement-
ing this requirement is Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13T(c), T.D. 8003, 1985-6 I.R.B. 5, 8.




Wiedenbeck: Wiedenbeck: Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Today, under section 1011(b), TP's reporting position will not withstand at-
tack. First, consider the after-tax consequences of the transaction for TP in
the absence of section 101 (b). Assuming TP is in the fifty-percent bracket, if
he merely sold the stock he would be left with $9000 of cash after
taxes-$5000 of the sale proceeds would be treated as a return of capital, plus
$3000, which is the untaxed sixty percent of the long-term gain, plus $1000,
which is fifty percent of the taxable appreciation. A bargain sale to charity
would net TP almost as much, $7500-$5000 sale proceeds, all of which
would be treated as a return of capital, plus $2,500, the tax savings that would
result from the deduction of the appreciation component for a fifty-percent
taxpayer. The results could be truly egregious in the case of a bargain sale of
highly appreciated property by a taxpayer subject to the seventy-percent mar-
ginal rate.
Under section 1011(b), the bargain sale transaction is unscrambled by
treating it as though it consisted of a sale of one-half of the block of stock for
its fair market value and a gift of the remaining one-half of the stock. TP's
asserted unscrambling principle-that the bargain sale should be treated as a
sale of the entire block of stock for its adjusted basis plus a gift of the appreci-
ation component-has been rejected. Hence, under current law the bargain
sale device would leave TP with $7000 of cash after taxes (recall the sixty-
percent deduction for long-term capital gain), rather than $7500, again as-
suming TP is a fifty-percent taxpayer.
9. General Millers, Inc. processes grain and manufactures prepared
food products. Its biggest seller is a breakfast cereal called "Flakos," famous
for its big orange box. General Millers often prints limited-offer coupons and
prize competitions on the box. Any Flakos boxes that remain on grocers'
shelves when the coupons or competitions expire are pulled and shipped back
to General Millers. General Millers either destroys the returns or processes
them into livestock feed, thereby realizing a small fraction of the product's
retail value, although the Flakos are still wholesome and edible. Why doesn't
General Millers donate the Flakos to a charity that would distribute the ce-
real to the poor? Sections 170(a) & (e), 165(b). Hint: compare the fair mar-
ket value of the Flakos before and after the expiration date of the coupons or
competitions.
To understand the origin of this socially unjustifiable behavior, first as-
sume that General Millers reprocesses the cereal into cattle feed. In this event,
General Millers would claim a loss on the transaction computed under section
1001 as the adjusted basis of the Flakos reduced by the amount realized. The
combination of General Millers' loss deduction and the proceeds of the sale of
the feed (if any) will equal its adjusted basis in the product, which is its cost
of producing the Flakos. Hence a manufacturer or dealer is assured a tax-free
recovery of its investment where devalued merchandise is disposed of by aban-
donment, destruction, or distress sale.
The tax consequences for General Millers are quite different if it instead
donates the cereal to charity. The general rule under section 170 for the
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amount of a charitable contribution deduction is fair market value. But what
is the fair market value of the Flakos after the expiration date of the coupon
offers or prize competitions? Since the grocers won't sell the Flakos after the
expiration date, the fair market value is drastically reduced, and in all likeli-
hood is less than General Millers' adjusted basis in the Flakos-that is, less
than its actual cost of production. Consequently, General Millers would never
get to deduct its full production costs if it donates the depreciated inventory to
charity. The company is better off tax-wise if it destroys the product rather
than devoting it to socially beneficial uses! This hypothetical illustrates that
the fair market value rule of section 170 cuts both ways-in some situations
taxpayers may be permitted to deduct unrealized appreciation, but in the case
of a donation of depreciated property the taxpayer cannot even recover the
actual after-tax investment in the property.
1 26
The fact that a charitable contribution of devalued inventory is not as
beneficial from a tax standpoint as the destruction or abandonment of the
property causes a serious disincentive for businesses to make badly needed
contributions of food and clothing. Recognizing this disincentive, in 1984 the
IRS amended its regulations to provide for a full adjusted basis deduction for
contributions of devalued inventory described in section 170(e)(3)-property
to be used for the care of the ill, needy or infants.1 27 Despite its questionable
legal authority,128 the new regulation solves the practical problem, but only
126. The Treasury Department tax reform plan would also limit the deduction
for contributed property to fair market value, where this is less than the property's
current adjusted basis. TREASURY REPORT ON TAX REFORM, supra note 96, at 73.
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4A(c)(3), T.D. 7962, 49 Fed. Reg. 27317 (July 3,
1984). The amended regulation works indirectly to provide relief. The deduction avail-
able under section 170 is still limited to the value of the contributed property, but the
donor's cost of goods sold is reduced by the lesser of adjusted basis or fair market
value, thereby assuring that any decline in value of the contributed item will be re-
flected as a reduction in the donor's gross income from sales of other items. The state-
ment of basis and purpose published with the amended" regulation provides:
Where the basis of the contributed inventory property qualifying under
section 170(e)(3) exceeds the property's fair market value, the underlying
purpose of the section to encourage contributions of this type of property for
the purposes specified in section 170(e)(3) may be frustrated. This is because
the entire basis of the contributed property is removed from the cost of goods
sold while the charitable contribution is limited to the property's fair market
value. It would be more advantageous for the taxpayer to destroy or sell the
property than to contribute it for the care of the ill, the needy, or infants. A
taxpayer would then be entitled to deduct its entire basis in the property as a
loss deduction under section 165 or as part of the cost of goods sold as com-
pared to a charitable contribution amount limited to the property's fair mar-
ket value.
In order to remove this disincentive, these final regulations provide that
the taxpayer's cost of goods sold will be reduced by the lesser of the fair
market value or the amount of the basis of the contributed property.
49 Fed. Reg. 27313 (July 3, 1984).
128. The amended regulation purports to interpret section 170(e)(3), which is an
exception to the general reduction rules of section 170(e)(1). Because section 170(e)
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where the contributed property is to be used for the care of the ill, needy, or
infants. Accordingly, a computer company that is discontinuing an outdated
model would still be deterred by the tax law from contributing its excess in-
ventory to educational institutions, for example.
E. Contributions of Partial Interests
10. TP transfers 1000 shares of General Motors stock in trust, the in-
come to be paid to his daughter for ten years, remainder to the University of
Missouri. TP names his bank as trustee. Can TP take a charitable contribu-
tion deduction for the value of the remainder interest? Sections 170(f)(2)(A),
664(d), 642(c)(5). What result if the trust corpus consists of twenty-year GM
bonds that pay interest at ten percent annually, and the trustee has no author-
ity to change investments? What is the underlying policy of section
170(f)(2)(A)?
Section 170(O(2)(A) provides that no deduction is allowed for the value
of a remainder interest in a trust contributed to charity, unless the trust quali-
fies as a charitable remainder annuity trust, a charitable remainder unitrust,
or a pooled income fund. Treating first the case where the trust corpus consists
of GM stock, because the trust is not maintained by the University of Mis-
souri and consists of property transferred by only one donor, it does not qualify
as a pooled income fund. The investment return of the trust, consisting of
dividends on the GM stock and income from other investments the trustee
may make in the exercise of its management powers and duty to diversify, is
of course variable. Because the trust income to be paid to TP's daughter is not
a sum certain or a fixed percentage of the fair market value of the corpus, the
trust does not qualify either as a charitable remainder annuity or unitrust, and
no deduction will be allowed for the contribution of the remainder interest.
If instead the trust corpus consists of ten percent GM bonds and the trus-
tee has no authority to alter the investment, TP's daughter, the income benefi-
ciary, will receive a sum certain which is greater than five percent of the initial
fair market value of the trust corpus, payable annually for ten years. Hence
the trust should qualify as a charitable remainder annuity trust.1 2 Yet if the
draftsman of the trust instrument did not pay careful attention to the precise
technical requirements contained in the regulation defining "charitable re-
operates only to reduce the amount of a charitable contribution below fair market
value in certain cases involving donations of appreciated property, it is difficult to un-
derstand how section 170(e)(3) can be read to authorize an increase in the taxpayer's
deduction above market value. Note especially the language of section 170(e)(3)(B),
which refers to "the amount of the reduction."
129. The regulations require that the "governing instrument provides that the
trust shall pay a sum certain not less often than annually," and define a sum certain as
a "stated dollar amount." Treas. Reg. § 1.664-2(a)(1) (1972). Arguably, these require-
ments should be considered to be satisfied where, as here, the trust instrument specifies
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mainder annuity trust," TP will not be entitled to a deduction. Here, for ex-
ample, there is no indication that the trust instrument prohibits future addi-
tions to trust,130 or that the amount of the trust income to be distributed to
TP's daughter during the trust's taxable years in which her annuity payments
begin and end is the properly annualized portion of the sum certain.131 These
strict requirements, which present serious traps for the unwary, are imposed to
assure level payments (and therefore a readily calculable present value of the
remainder interest) throughout the annuity term.
These special restrictions on the deductibility of a remainder interest con-
tributed to charity are designed to assure that the present value deduction
given the grantor3 2 will reasonably correspond to the amount that the charity
will in fact eventually receive. 3 3 Prior to 1970, the contributor's deduction for
the remainder interest was computed by treating an income interest as an as-
sumed annuity in an amount equal to three and one-half percent of the value
of the property placed in trust, even though there were no restrictions on the
amount or method of computing the noncharitable income payments. Since it
was also assumed that this three and one-half percent payout to the income
beneficiary represented the total rate of return on trust assets, the charity was
expected to receive property with a value, measured at the time the income
interest(s) expire, equal to the original value of the property settled in trust.
That is, prior to 1970 the deduction for a charitable remainder was computed
by discounting the value of the property for the expected duration of the in-
come interest(s), but using a discount rate of only three and one-half percent!
Consider what might happen under this approach if the trustee was the spouse
of the grantor (the mother of the income beneficiary in our hypothetical) and
had complete authority to direct the investments of the trust. The trustee
could put the corpus in high-yield, high-risk investments, thereby shifting most
of the financial benefit of the property to the income beneficiary at the expense
of the charity.
11. Now assume that TP transfers stock to his bank as trustee, and that
the trust instrument requires that ten percent of the annual fair market value
of the trust be distributed yearly to the local hospital, for eight years, at
which time the trust will terminate and the corpus will be distributed to TP's
daughter. Can TP deduct the value of the income interest? Section
170(f)(2)(B). What result if TP himself retains the remainder interest? Sec-
tion 673(a). Why the difference in result?
Although a fixed percentage of the fair market value of the property in
130. Id. § 1.664-2(b).
131. Id. § 1.664-2(a)(1)(iv). For example, a trust created on December 20 that
uses a calendar year accounting period may receive a quarterly interest payment on the
GM bonds before December 31, but could not, consistently with the definition of an
annuity trust, pass along the entire interest payment to TP's daughter.
132. Id. § 1.170A-6(b)(2); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.664-2(c), 20.2031-7 (1984).
133. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 86-90 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 413,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 58-60 (1969).
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trust is distributed annually, if TP's daughter is the remainderman no deduc-
tion will be allowed because TP is not treated as the owner of the income
interest under section 671. If TP retains the remainder himself, he will be
treated as the owner of the income interest of the trust pursuant to sections
671 and 673(a), and he will be entitled to deduct the value of the income
interest. If TP is treated as the owner, he will be subject to tax on the trust
income under the grantor trust rules, so the allowance of a deduction of the
present value of the income interest merely serves to wash out the future in-
come.1 3 4 If TP is not, for tax purposes, the owner of the income interest, the
trust is an effective method of shifting liability for tax on the property income.
Because TP will not be taxed on the future income, he is not also allowed to
deduct the value of the income interest. Note that in order to deduct the value
of the income interest under section 170(f)(2)(B) the interest must take the
form of a guaranteed annuity or the annual payment of a fixed percentage of
the trust's fair market value, in order to permit a reasonably accurate valua-
tion of the interest.' 35
12. TP owns an enormously valuable collection of Picasso sketches. By
deed of gift, TP transfers the collection to her brother for life, remainder to
the National Museum of Art. When can TP claim a deduction, and for how
much? Section 170(a)(3). What result if TP transfers the collection to the
National Museum for the life of her brother, remainder to her niece? Section
170(f)(3)(A).
Under section 170(a), an individual's charitable contribution deduction is
allowed for the year in which the donation is actually paid, without regard to
the taxpayer's method of accounting-an accrual-basis taxpayer that makes a
pledge to charity during the taxable year cannot claim a deduction until the
taxable year in which the pledge is satisfied by actual payment. The gift of a
future interest in tangible personal property is not treated as paid until all
intervening interests terminate or are held by persons other than the taxpayer
and the persons related to the taxpayer that are specified in section 267(b).
Accordingly, TP would not be allowed a deduction until the death of her
brother, and the amount deductible at that time would be determined by the
then-current fair market value of the property.1"6
134. The deduction is allowed as a lump sum in the year the trust is created.
135. The hypothetical assumes TP created a unitrust (i.e., income payout is a
fixed percentage of the trust's annual asset value). Because the unitrust payout is deter-
mined according to the variable asset value of the trust, computing the present value of
the income and remainder interests under a unitrust is quite complicated. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.170A-6(c)(3)(ii), -6(b)(2) (1972); Treas. Reg. 1.664-4 (1984).
136. In his tax return for 1969, President Nixon claimed a deduction for a chari-
table contribution to the United States of his Vice Presidential papers, valued at
$576,000. The deed of gift provided that during the time Mr. Nixon held the office of
President of the United States only he and such other persons as he might designate
could have access to the papers. The staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation concluded that this restriction made the transfer a gift of a future interest
which under section 170(a)(3) was not deductible in 1969. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM.
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If instead TP transfers the collection to the National Museum of Art for
the life of her brother, remainder to her niece, the present possessory interest
constitutes immediate payment, but section 170(f)(3) must be consulted to
determine whether the value of this partial interest is deductible. The general
criterion for deductibility of a partial interest not in trust contributed to char-
ity is whether a deduction would be allowed under section 170(0(2) if the
partial interest had been transferred in trust- If the collection were transferred
in trust the Museum would have an equitable life estate pur autre vie, which is
"other than a remainder interest." No deduction would be allowed for the
value of such an interest under subsection (f)(2)(B), since it does take the
form of a guaranteed annuity or a fixed percentage of the fair market value of
the property payable annually. Again, this result is justified by the problem of
valuing uses.
13. TP owns farmland that is frequently flooded by runoff from adja-
cent property owned by the federal government. Will TP be allowed to deduct
the value of a flowage easement contributed to the United States? Assume
first that the runoff is from the parking lot of the local VA hospital. Section
170(f)(3)(A), (0(2). What if the flooding is due to the government's failure
to control a river that is preserved in its natural, free-flowing state under the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act?1 37 Section 170(f)(3)(B), (h).
The contribution of an easement consisting of the right to use TP's prop-
erty for flooding would not give rise to a deduction under the trust rules be-
cause use of the land does not generate a guaranteed yield equivalent to an
annuity or the annual payment of a percentage of the fair market value of the
realty.138 Section 170(f)(3)(B) provides certain exceptions to the very strin-
gent limitations on the deductibility of contributions of partial interests not in
trust. TP's grant of the flowage easement is not a contribution of a remainder
interest in a farm139 nor is it a contribution of an undivided portion of his
entire interest in the property."10 However, if the flooding is caused by the
overflow of a wild and scenic river, TP's contribution may constitute a quali-
ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, EXAMINATION OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S TAX RE-
TURNS FOR 1969 THROUGH 1972, H.R. REP. No. 966, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-41, A-85
to A-151 (1974).
137. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1982).
138. Whether the flowage easement should be analogized to an income interest
(as a right of use) or a remainder interest (as a perpetual interest) in the land is un-
clear, but under either subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 170(0(2) the corresponding
interest in trust would not qualify for the charitable deduction.
139. Special rules are prescribed to prevent abuse in the valuation of a real prop-
erty remainder interest. I.R.C. § 170(0(4) (1982).
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-7(b)(l)(ii), based on language in the conference re-
port to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, states that an open space easement in gross shall
be considered a contribution of an undivided portion of the donor's entire interest in
property. This strained interpretation of the undivided interest exception was super-
seded by the 1980 amendments to section 170 that added the qualified conservation
contribution provisions. S. REP. No. 1007, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980).
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fled conservation contribution. The United States is a qualified organization,
and the donation is made exclusively for conservation purposes, so the flowage
easement will constitute a qualified conservation contribution under section
170(h), provided that the easement is a restriction in perpetuity on the use
which TP may make of the underlying farmland. The flowage easement may
or may not be a perpetual restriction on TP's use of the real estate. The deter-
minative issue becomes whether the easement is just an affirmative right to
flood TP's land, or whether TP is in addition prohibited from altering the land
(such as by cutting trees or erecting structures). 141 Where the easement quali-
fies as a perpetual conservation restriction, the amount deductible is the fair
market value of the contributed property, which is the difference in value of
the grantor's land before and after contributing the servitude.1 4 2 If develop-
ment inconsistent with the land's conservation uses is not prohibited or is a
remote factual possibility (i.e., where the easement does not significantly re-
strict in both law and fact current or foreseeable future uses of the land), only
a nominal deduction is allowable.1 4 3
F. Direct Charitable Deduction for Non-Itemizers
14. Prior to 1982, the charitable contribution deduction, like other per-
sonal deductions for interest, taxes, casualty losses and the like, was allowed
only to taxpayers who itemized their deductions. Read section 170(i), added
by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. What organizations and activi-
ties would you expect to derive the greatest benefit from section 170(i)? Note
that the direct charitable deduction first becomes fully effective for taxable
years beginning in 1986, yet expires on December 31, 1986. Why?
An overwhelming majority of all taxpayers, some sixty-five percent in
141. The proposed regulations under section 170(h) equate the term "perpetual
conservation restriction" with an easement under state real property law, and in addi--
tion provide that the statutory term perpetual conservation restriction "is not intended
to preclude the deductibility of a donation of affirmative rights to use a land or water
area" for recreation or education of the general public. Prop. Reg. § 1.170A-13(b)(3),
48 Fed. Reg. 22,941, 22,942 (May 23, 1983). Despite the apparent breadth of this
definition, not all easements will qualify because the regulations also require that no
deduction will be allowed if the grant "would permit destruction of other significant
conservation interests." Id. § 1.170A-13(e)(3). And under state law, the grant of an
easement (a right to use another's realty) standing alone, does not restrict the grantor's
right to use the servient tenement in ways not incompatible with the use authorized by
the easement (here, flooding). RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 486, 481, 483(b) &
comment g (1944). Where the easement does not significantly restrict the donor's right
to use his land, the issue may also be framed in terms of the amount deductible.
142. Prop. Reg. § 1.170A-13(h)(3) (1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 22,941, 22942 (May
23, 1983).
143. Valuation disputes are currently a major point of contention between the
IRS and conservation groups attempting to promote such donations. Wall St. J., Oct.
24, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
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1982,144 do not itemize their deductions. Prior to 1981 these taxpayers re-
ceived no tax allowance for their contributions. Thus, they bore the full cost of
giving-each dollar donated to charity reduced their after-tax income by a
dollar. Yet recent economic studies indicate that low and middle-income
households (in which nonitemizers are concentrated) are quite sensitive to the
after-tax cost of giving. These studies found that itemizers contribute substan-
tially more than nonitemizers at the same income level (more than twice as
much for income below $30,000145), and that extending the deduction to
nonitemizers would probably increase charitable contributions by more than
double the resulting drop in tax revenue.114 Congress responded to this evi-
dence by enacting the direct charitable contribution deduction in 1981. The
deduction for nonitemizers has a built-in expiration date because Congress
designed it as an experiment. The expiration date will force Congress to evalu-
ate the effects of allowing the deduction to nonitemizers and judge its effi-
ciency.1 47 If it should appear in 1986 that the direct charitable deduction in-
creases donations to charities by an amount that is less than its revenue cost to
the federal government, 148 reenactment would be unlikely.
The organizations likely to benefit most. from the direct charitable deduc-
tion are those that receive contributions predominately from nonitemizers, who
are in general lower-income taxpayers. Lower-income taxpayers on the aver-
age make most of their charitable contributions to religious and community
144. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, S01 BULLETIN, Summer 1984, at 119, 120.
145. Morgan, Dye & Hybels, supra note 31, at 192-95.
146. Boskin & Feldstein, Effects of the Charitable Deduction on Contributions
by Low Income and Middle Income Households: Evidence from the National Survey
of Philanthropy, 59 REV. ECON. STAT. 351, 352 (1977) (estimated price elasticity of
charitable giving for households with incomes between $1000 and $30,000 is -2.54,
considerably greater than prior studies' estimate of -1.2 for the entire population). Al-
though this level of responsiveness to the tax allowance may at first seem counterintui-
tive, it should be remembered that the value of a deduction at low income levels is
small, so that the resulting increase in the dollar amount of gifts per household, even if
double the tax reduction, would nowhere near double annual giving. Id. at 354. Yet the
aggregate increase in giving, with nonitemizers constituting 65% of the taxpaying pop-
ulation, is potentially enormous.
147. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 1ST SEss., SUM-
MARY OF H.R. 4242: GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT
49 (Comm. Print 1981).
148. A bill to make permanent the direct charitable deduction for nonitemizers
has been introduced. S. 337, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Testimony at a hearing on
the bill indicated that section 170(i) has stimulated contributions. See 25 TAX NOTES
13 (1984). But other studies indicate that it may take a period of several years to
accustom taxpayers to the deduction before the full stimulative effect is obtained. Mor-
gan, Dye & Hybels, supra note 31, at 194: "It would seem that it takes longer to build
to a higher level of giving with a new tax incentive than to cut down when the incentive
is removed." Charitable Contribution Deductions: Hearings on S. 219 Before the Sub-
comm. on Taxation & Debt Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Hearings] (testimony of C.
Clotfelter) ("it would take 4 to 8 years for 90% of the long-run increase in giving to be
realized after the change in incentive").
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service organizations, such as churches and the United Way. In contrast, high-
income taxpayers, who generally itemize their deductions, direct proportion-
ately more of their charitable contributions to higher education, hospitals, and
cultural organizations (such as museums, theater groups and orchestras).'49
Although religious and community service organizations will receive the
most direct and immediate benefit from the deduction for nonitemizers, in the
long run all charities will gain, if the effect of the provision is to broaden the
base of philanthropy and develop a habit of charitable giving. During 1980
congressional hearings on an above-the-line deduction proposal (i.e., a deduc-
tion available to taxpayers who do not itemize), it was observed that while the
total dollar amount of charitable contributions has increased in recent years,
the number of contributors, and especially the number of young contributors,
has declined significantly. 50 The above-the-line deduction may encourage
younger taxpayers, who generally have lower incomes and do not itemize, to
make charitable contributions.' 5 Over time, such taxpayers may adopt a be-
havioral pattern of giving. In later life such individuals, who might otherwise
not have formed a philanthropic habit, may become substantial contributors.
Consequently, the deduction for nonitemizers may be important to the long-
term vitality of the nonprofit sector, including those organizations that rely
heavily on contributions from well-educated, high-income individuals.
The 1984 Treasury Department tax reform plan proposes repeal of the
deduction for nonitemizers, primarily for reasons of simplification and admin-
istrative convenience. The report asserts that the adverse impact on giving "is





For taxable years beginning in 1976, 1977, and 1978, the charitable con-
tribution deduction for individuals was included in the computation of "ad-
justed itemized deductions" subject to the fifteen-percent add-on minimum
tax. 5 3 "Adjusted itemized deductions," an item of tax preference, was defined
149. See supra text accompanying note 56.
150. 1980 Hearings, supra note 148, at 93 (testimony of J. Pier); id. at 225-26
(statement of Sen. Moynihan).
151. Available data indicate that charitable giving increases substantially with
age. Boskin & Feldstein, supra note 146, at 352-53.
152. TREASURY REPORT ON TAX REFORM, supra note 96, at 78-79. An
econometric study indicates that repeal of the deduction for nonitemizers is likely to
reduce charitable giving by about four percent. Clotfelter, supra note 34, at 481.
153. I.R.C. § 56(a) (1976), amended by Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 (hereinafter cited as "TEFRA"), Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 201(d)(1)(A), 96
Stat. 324, 413 (limiting the add-on minimum tax to corporations), and I.R.C. §
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as the amount by which all itemized deductions excluding taxes, medical ex-
penses and casualty losses, exceeds sixty percent of the taxpayer's adjusted
gross income for the year.254 For taxable years beginning between 1979 and
1982 (inclusive), such "adjusted itemized deductions" were instead made sub-
ject to the alternative minimum tax of section 55.1r, In 1982, the charitable
contribution deduction was eliminated from the base of the alternative mini-
mum tax.15
6
It might be assumed that this checkered history is attributable to congres-
sional ambivalence over whether charitable contributions are properly charac-
terized as an "item of tax preference" (that is, a tax expenditure). However,
the "preference" label apparently was never seriously questioned. The add-on
minimum tax was enacted for primarily cosmetic reasons.157 Against this
background it was natural to strike at excessive use of "voluntary" itemized
deductions (interest and charitable contributions) because these expenditures,
when combined with the deduction for long-term capital gains, were the prin-
cipal route by which many high-income individuals had managed to escape all
tax liability. 58 During Senate debate on the Tax Reform Act of 1976 an
57(a)(1) (1976), amended by TEFRA § 201(b)(1)(A). For effective dates, see Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 301(g), 90 Stat. 1520, 1553, and Revenue
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 421(b)(2), (g), 92 Stat. 2763, 2874, 2877.
154. I.R.C. § 57(b) (1976), amended by TEFRA § 204(b) (1982). The Revenue
Act of 1978 made a technical correction to the definition of adjusted itemized deduc-
tions by providing that taxes, medical expenses, and casualty losses (i.e., those itemized
deductions not viewed with suspicion) must be excluded from both the numerator (total
itemized deductions) and the denominator (adjusted gross income) in applying the 60%
test for excessive use of itemized deductions. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 421(b)(3), (g), 92
Stat. 2763, 2874, 2877 (1978).
155. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(C)(i) (Supp. I 1978), amended by TEFRA § 201(a)
(1982). The Revenue Act of 1978 also removed adjusted itemized deductions from the
list of preferences subject to the add-on minimum tax by adding a new sentence at the
end of section 57(a). Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 421(b)(2), (g), repealed by TEFRA §
201(b)(2)(B) (1982).
156. TEFRA § 201(b)(1)(A) (1982).
157. The add-on minimum tax was enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, and
its principal original targets were the deduction for long-term gains and the tax-shelter
effect of excessive depletion, depreciation, and amortization. The Finance Committee
report observed:
The fact that present law permits a small minority of high-income indi-
viduals to escape tax on a large proportion of their income has seriously un-
dermined the belief of taxpayers that others are paying their fair share of the
tax burden. It is essential that tax reform be obtained not only as a matter of
justice but also as a matter of taxpayer morale. Our individual and corporate
income taxes, which are the mainstays of our tax system, depend upon self-
assessment and the cooperation of taxpayers. The loss of confidence on their
part in the fairness of the tax system could result in a breakdown of taxpayer
morale and make it far more difficult to collect the necessary revenues. For
this reason alone, the tax system should be improved.
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1969); see also id. at 112.
158. The 1976 extension of the minimum tax to itemized deductions was ex-
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amendment was offered which would have removed charitable contributions
from the definition of excess itemized deductions. Yet proponents of the
amendment argued that the minimum tax should not be permitted to deter
charitable contributions, not that contributions are not properly classified as
tax expenditures. 15 9 For their part, opponents of the measure also did not ad-
dress this fundamental issue, instead emphasizing that charitable contributions
were included in the minimum tax base to placate taxpayers.
In the effort to be sure that people could not of their own volition and
their own choice just avoid paying any income tax and have us trying to ex-
plain that all the time, we had to do something about the charitable deduction
160
Again in 1982, when charitable contributions were removed from the
reach of the minimum tax, classification of the deduction as a tax preference
was unchallenged. Congress apparently concluded that the percentage limits of
section 170(b) provide adequate assurance that contributors pay their fair
share of support to the federal government."6'
It was demonstrated earlier that the charitable contribution deduction is a
tax expenditure if the nondeductibility of ordinary gifts follows from viewing
such transfers as the purchase of "intangible consumption" by the donor. But
if the nondeductibility of ordinary gifts is an anti-abuse measure, premised on
the ease with which gifts could be used to shift tax liability without shifting
beneficial enjoyment of the property ("disguised consumption" by the donor),
then the charitable contribution deduction is a proper allowance in measuring
the contributor's disposable income.1 62 Although the "intangible consumption"
rationale seems to be more consistent with current law, neither Congress nor
plained as follows:
This preference is intended to reduce the number of situations in which a
person with a large adjusted gross income is able to avoid paying any income
tax. Medical and casualty deductions are excluded from this preference item
because they are limited to expenses that are beyond the control of the
taxpayer.
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESs., GENERAL EXPLANA-
TION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 (H.R. 10612, 94TH CONGRESS, PUBLIc LAW
94-455) 105-06 (1976); see also S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1969)
("Many [high-income taxpayers] were nontaxable because they were able to exclude
one-half of capital gains from their income and offset all their itemized deductions
against the remaining income subject to tax.").
159. 122 CONG. REC. 20246 (1976) (colloquy between Sens. Curtis and Brock),
20268-69 (remarks of Sen. Curtis).
160. 122 CONG. REC. 20268 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Long).
161. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1982). Note, however, that
voluntary charitable contributions could, in combination with other deductions and
credits, reduce taxable income to zero despite the percentage limits. This fact was em-
phasized by Senator Long in his remarks in opposition to the 1976 proposal to delete
contributions from the "adjusted itemized deductions" preference item. 122 CONG.
REC. 20268-69 (1976).
162. See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court has ever explained why, since 1913, ordinary gifts have
been taxed to the donor rather than the donee.11 3 Hence the classification of
the charitable contribution deduction as a tax expenditure rests upon tenuous
inferences drawn from meager circumstantial evidence. In these circumstances
the wisest course may be to recognize that there is very little practical differ-
ence between these approaches from the standpoint of the overall structure of
an income tax, and that nice academic arguments which conclude by labelling
the charitable contribution deduction a "subsidy" ought not be permitted to
create such differences. Accordingly, the charitable contribution deduction
should not again be made subject to the minimum tax.
In recent years, it has become almost automatic for tax theorists and
policymakers to treat the charitable contribution deduction as a "preference"
or "tax subsidy." This view is reflected in the tax expenditure budget," and
has crept into the Supreme Court's analysis and interpretation of the tax-ex-
empt status accorded charitable organizations. 65 Unthinking acceptance of
this label, however fashionable, is likely to produce undesirable consequences,
such as renewed attempts to subject charitable contributions to the minimum
tax. Concerning another area (accelerated depreciation) in which there is no
single "correct" definition of income, Professor Kahn has cautioned that the
tax expenditure label creates a "substantial risk that congressional debate on
that item will be limited to the merits of subsidizing particular behavior and
163. It is interesting to note that under the 1894 act gifts and inheritances of
personal property would have been taxed to both the donor and donee. Act of August
27, 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553 (income includes "money and the value of all
personal property acquired by gift or inheritance"). Although this provision was en-
acted, it was vehemently opposed on the grounds that it was in substance an inheri-
tance tax, that the federal government had no business usurping the traditional power
of the states in the field of inheritance taxation, and that intrafamily gifts could not
properly be considered as income. 26 CONG. REC. 6778-80, 6820-25 (1894) (colloquy
between Sens. Hoar, Hill, Vest, and Chandler). When the matter was again considered
in 1913, the exclusion of gifts and bequests was apparently founded on a view that such
transfers are more appropriately handled under a separate tax. 50 CONG. REc. 506
(1913) (statement of Rep. Hull) ("Bequests, devises and so forth, are not considered as
taxable income; an inheritance tax applicable to them would naturally contain rather
highly graduated rates, so that this tax would properly be contained in a separate
enactment.").
164. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FY 1985 G-46 (1984), lists as tax expenditures the
deductibility of charitable contributions for education (revenue loss = $810 million),
health (revenue loss = $1.62 billion), and all other functions (revenue loss = $11.06
billion).
165. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2028 (1983); Regan v.
Taxation with Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2000 (1983) ("Both tax exemptions
and tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax sys-
tem."). For criticism of the Supreme Court's new subsidy analysis, see Kelley, A New
Meaning for Tax Exemption?, 25 J. CHURCH & STATE 415 (1983); Schachner, Reli-
gion and the Public Treasury After Taxation with Representation of Washington,
Mueller and Bob Jones, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 275.
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will not investigate whether it offers a proper measure of net income."166 This
warning is equally applicable to the charitable contribution deduction.
2. Unrealized Appreciation
Ordinary charitable contributions should not be subject to the minimum
tax, but gifts of appreciated property are another matter. The exceptions to
the reduction rules of section 170(e)(1) were enacted to encourage certain
types of contributions (e.g., clothing to be used for the care of the needy, or
scientific equipment for use in research) or to maintain the level of support for
certain donees (e.g., stock and realty contributions to hospitals and colleges),
and are without independent conceptual support. Therefore, there is substan-
tial merit in the contention that all deductible unrealized gain (including the
deductible sixty percent of long-term gain on assets subject to the reduction
rule of section 170(e)(1)(B))' 67 should be subject to the minimum tax. Con-
gress has considered similar proposals in the past,"6 8 so future developments
along these lines should come as no surprise.
The interaction between the charitable contribution deduction and the
minimum tax may become a moot issue if Congress enacts one of the compre-
hensive income tax proposals now under consideration. Major tax reform of
the base-broadening sort might eliminate the deduction for unrealized appreci-
ation. 16 In addition, the minimum tax itself should be repealed as unnecessary
if most tax expenditures are eliminated.17 0
B. Percentage Limits
The percentage limits of section 170(b) are another front on which future
battles can be expected. Different annual limits on deductibility based on the
166. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowancefor Measuring Net Income?, 78 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979).
167. Because the 60% long-term capital gain deduction is an item of tax prefer-
ence on the sale of an asset under section 57(a)(9)(A), consistency would seem to re-
quire that the same amount be subject to the minimum tax if appreciated property is
contributed in kind.
168. In 1968, and again in 1969, the Treasury proposed that deductible unreal-
ized appreciation on in-kind contributions should be subject to a minimum tax. STAFF
OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 94TH CONG., lST SESS.,
CHANGES IN THE MINIMUM TAX AND LIMITS ON ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS 3-4 (Comm.
Print 1975). The minimum tax status of charitable contributions was also a major item
of contention in 1974. Id. at 8-10.
169. E.g., TREASURY REPORT ON TAX REFORM, supra note 96, at 72-74. Note,
however, that the other major tax reform proposals-the Bradley-Gephardt "FAIR
Tax" (H.R. 800 and S. 409, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. Si 173(daily ed. Feb. 6, 1985)) and the Kemp-Kasten "FAST Tax" (H.R. 777 and S. 325,
99th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 131 CONG. REc. S895 (daily ed. Jan. 31,
1985))-would not repeal the appreciated property deduction.
170. E.g., TREASURY REPORT ON TAX REFORM, supra note 96, at 112-14, 130-
32; BILL BRADLEY, THE FAIR TAX 163, 167 (1984).
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nature of the charitable donee first appeared with the 1954 Code.171 Since
then, the class of favored donees has been broadened repeatedly.172 The gap
between favored donees and private nonoperating foundations was narrowed
substantially by the Tax Reform Act of 1984-the adjusted gross income limit
on contributions to private nonoperating foundations was raised from twenty
to thirty percent and for the first time a carryover for excess contributions was
allowed. 17 3 To the extent that the difference in percentage limits is founded
upon a concern over excessive accumulations or the potential for conflicts of
interest between a private foundation and its control persons (management
and substantial contributors), the reason for the distinction has been largely
undercut by the excise taxes on private foundations and a continuing trend
toward increased regulation.
Is a difference in contribution limits appropriate, other than as an awk-
ward attempt to limit abuses? The lower deductibility limit on gifts to private
nonoperating foundations may or may not be justified as a matter of principle.
Here again, the answer will depend on the prevailing view of the policy justifi-
cation for the charitable contribution deduction. If it were agreed that the
proper tax treatment of gifts is to tax only the recipient because he is the
taxpayer who ultimately consumes the income, then no distinction among
charitable donees would be appropriate, provided there are sufficient regula-
tory safeguards to prevent self-dealing and other transactions that benefit the
donor ("disguised consumption").
If it is instead agreed that section 170 is a tax expenditure (the "intangi-
ble consumption" rationale), the matter is more complex. The question then
turns upon why we subsidize charitable contributions. Two fundamentally dif-
ferent explanations are generally advanced---charitable contributions should
be encouraged because they (1) reduce the burdens of government, or (2) pro-
mote pluralism.
The first of these explanations views charitable organizations as quasi-
governmental agencies .1 4 Following through on this analogy, one might con-
clude that the tax subsidy is appropriate only for charities that provide ser-
vices government would otherwise need to furnish. Of course, voluntarism has
always been a significant factor in American life, so it is impossible to answer
the hypothetical question, "Which of the social services that government has
never had to provide would be continued in the absence of private initiative?"
This uncertainty might lead one to conclude that important but "nonessential"
171. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4019, 4050, 4190.
172. Clause (iv) of section 170(b)(1)(A) was added in 1962, clauses (v) and (vi)
were added in 1964, clauses (vii) and (viii) were added in 1969.
173. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1464 (1984).
174. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2026-28 (1983).
Viewed as quasi-governmental agencies, the tax-exempt status of charitable organiza-
tions becomes merely an extension of the principle of intergovernmental tax immunity.
I.R.C. § 115 (1982).
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social services (in the sense that substitute government financing is in doubt)
should not be entirely ineligible for the tax subsidy, but deserve a reduced rate
of subsidy. 175 Note that organizations receiving broad public support, which
are fifty-percent donees under section 170(b)(1)(A), are the organizations
whose activities are likely to have sufficient political appeal to attract substi-
tute government funding.
If the primary function of the charitable contribution deduction is to pro-
mote pluralism, the different percentage limits of section 170(b) should be
repealed. It is exactly the organizations with nontraditional views, views which
do not receive broad public support, that contribute most to a pluralistic soci-
ety. These are the organizations that experiment and innovate, but these are
also organizations likely to be subject to the thirty-percent limit of section
170(b)(1)(B).
The tension between reducing the burdens of government and promoting
pluralism will never be resolved, of course. Both policies are embodied in the
charitable contribution deduction; both are asserted whenever either the per-
centage limits or the definition of charitable organizations is at issue. Inevita-
bly, any change in section 170(b) will require a new compromise between
these interests. 176
IV. CONCLUSION
Three different treatments of ordinary gifts-taxing the donor, taxing the
donee, and taxing both-are completely consistent with an income tax base177
Since 1913, our system has chosen to tax the donor, but it is not generally
understood that this result could follow as well from a preference for taxing
the donee, combined with recognition of the formidable enforcement difficul-
ties that would entail. These competing rationales for the current tax treat-
ment of ordinary gifts (donor tax versus donee tax) translate into differing
policy justifications for the charitable contribution deduction-tax expenditure
versus proper allowance in measuring disposable income. These competing ra-
tionales could produce significantly different resolutions of several important
charitable contribution issues, including the U.S.-use requirement,178
earmarked gifts, 79 percentage limitations,180 and the applicability of the mini-
mum tax.181 Yet the results in these areas remain ambivalent; the rules of
175. Of course, the amount of tax subsidy depends upon the donor's marginal tax
bracket, and is not directly related to the percentage limits. However, private founda-
tions are almost always endowed by top-bracket donors, so a limitation on the amount
of deductible endowment could be viewed as a crude device for limiting the subsidy.
Break, supra note 41, at 1531.
176. See supra note 96.
177. See supra note 16.
178. See supra note 62.
179. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 173-76.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 162-66.
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current law sometimes reflect the tax expenditure rationale, sometimes the in-
come measurement rationale, sometimes both. Because these competing ratio-
nales have coexisted for seventy years without significant discord, we should be
very suspicious of any change motivated by a tax expenditure view of the char-
itable contribution deduction that is not also in harmony with the income-
measurement view. The long and short of it is that, in this field, tax expendi-
ture analysis should be granted little, if any, effect.
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